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PUBLIC RESEARCH AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT:
PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH*
Rebecca S. Eisenbergt
The year 1980 marked a sea change in U.S. government policy
toward intellectual property rights in the results of government-
sponsored research. In two statutes passed that year,' Congress
endorsed a new vision of how best to get these research results
utilized in the private sector. Previous legislation had typically
encouraged or required that federal agencies sponsoring re-
search make the results widely available to the public through
government ownership or dedication to the public domain.2 But
* Copyright 1996, Rebecca S. Eisenberg. This Article is a part of a larger project on
Patents and Technology Transfer in the Human Genome Project. This research has
been supported by the Office of Health and Environmental Research of the U.S.
Department of Energy, the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School,
and the Green Center for the Study of Science and Society at the University of Texas
at Dallas. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Robert
Cook-Deegan, Richard Nelson, Lita Nelsen, Edmund Kitch, and workshop
participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University, the
University of Michigan Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, the
Green Center for the Study of Science and Society at the University of Texas at
Dallas, and the University of Texas Law School.
'Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
'The two statutes are the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311-2320 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-
3714 (1994)), and Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994)) (commonly known as the Bayh-
Dole Act).
2 See, e.g., Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 9, 88 Stat. 1878, 1887-1891 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5908 (1994)); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
§ 501(c), 83 Stat. 742, 799 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 951(c) (1994)); Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, § 104, 83 Stat. 805, 806 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2179(b) (1994)); Water Resources Research Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 303, 78 Stat. 329, 332, repealed by Water Research and
Development Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-467, § 410(a), 92 Stat. 1305, 1316; National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 106, 80 Stat. 718,
1663
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 82:1663
in this new vision, public ownership of research results was
equivalent to "dead-hand" control,' and the public domain was
a treacherous quicksand pit in which discoveries sink beyond
reach of the private sector. If the results of federally-sponsored
research were to be rescued from oblivion and successfully de-
veloped into commercial products, they would have to be pat-
ented and offered up for private appropriation.
This new strategy was touted as serving a number of con-
verging goals. It would ensure effective transfer and commer-
cial development of discoveries that would otherwise languish in
government and university archives. It would reinvigorate U.S.
industry by giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas that would en-
721 (originally codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1395(c)), repealed by Act of July 5,
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1379, 1385; Appalachian Regional
Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-4, § 302(d), 79 Stat. 5, 20 (codified as
amended at 40 U.S.C. app. § 302(e) (1994) and terminated as of Oct. 1, 1982,
pursuant to 40 U.S.C. app. § 405 (1994)); Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
272, § 204, 79 Stat. 997, 998-999 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6981
(1994)); Act of Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-295, 75 Stat. 628, 629 (expanding saline
water conversion program) (originally codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1954(b)),
repealed by The Saline Water Conversion Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-60, § 11, 85
Stat. 159, 163; Act of July 7, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-599, § 6, 74 Stat. 336, 337 (codified
at 30 U.S.C. § 666 (1994)); Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297,
§ 32, 75 Stat. 631, 634 (1961) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2572 (1994)); Helium Act
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-777, § 2, 74 Stat. 918, 920 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 167b (1994)); National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568,
§ 305, 72 Stat. 426, 435 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (1994)); Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919, 944-945 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1994)); Act of Aug. 14, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-733, 60 Stat. 1082, 1086
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 427i (1994)) (commonly known, with the
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as the Agriculture Research and Marketing Act
of 1946); Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-783, § 205(a), 60 Stat.
1087, 1090 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (1994)); cf. National Science
Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, § 12, 64 Stat. 149, 154 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1871) (providing for disposition of rights in inventions "in a
manner calculated to protect the public interest and the equities of the individual or
organization with which the contract or other arrangement is executed").
3 See Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings
on H.R. 6933 (mislabeled as H.R. 6033), H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, H.R. 2414 (The
President's Industrial Innovation Program) Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 286 (1980) [hereinafter House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation
Program] (statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation) (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.




hance productivity and create new jobs. And it would ensure
that U.S.-sponsored research discoveries were developed by
U.S. firms, rather than by foreign competitors who had too of-
ten come to dominate world markets for products based on
technologies pioneered in the United States.
The first of the 1980 statutes, the Stevenson-Wydler Technol-
ogy Innovation Act,' made technology transfer an integral part
of the research and development responsibilities of federal
laboratories and their employees. While some agencies had
previously viewed technology transfer as an inherent byproduct
of making discoveries widely available to anyone who wanted
them, it was now designated as a purposive task for agencies to
pursue conscientiously and deliberately The second statute,
commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act,6 encouraged small
businesses and nonprofit organizations to patent the results of
government-sponsored research by allowing them to retain pat-
ent ownership themselves, provided they were diligent about
getting patent applications on file and promoting commercial
development of the inventions. At the same time, the Bayh-
Dole Act clarified the authority of federal agencies to apply for
and hold patents, and to license their patents to the private sec-
tor on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis.' In 1983, President
Reagan significantly extended the reach of the new policy by di-
recting the heads of executive departments and agencies to ex-
tend the more generous title provisions that the Bayh-Dole Act
had provided only for small businesses and nonprofit organiza-
tions to all government contractors, including large businesses,
so that they too could own patents on inventions made in their
laboratories with federal funds.'
Subsequent legislation has continued to broaden and fortify
the emerging policy in favor of private appropriation of research
4 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-480, 94 Stat.
2311-2320) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)).
5 Id. § 3, 94 Stat. at 2312 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3702 (1994)).
6Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-3028 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211,301-307 (1994)).
7 Id., 94 Stat. at 3020-3023 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-203 (1994)).
8Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:




results. Today, we have in place a system that pervasively pro-
motes patenting federally-sponsored inventions wherever they
are made, whether in government, university, or private labora-
tories. Current law presumes that anyone involved in the re-
search project who wants the discovery to be patented should
prevail over the objections of anyone who thinks the discovery
should be placed in the public domain, absent exceptional cir-
cumstances Thus, for example, if a contractor fails to make a
timely election to retain title to the invention, the funding
agency may seek a patent,"0 and if neither the agency nor the
contractor has an interest in pursuing patent rights, the individ-
ual investigator who made the discovery may step in and claim
them.' If anyone sees money to be made through patenting a
government-sponsored research discovery, chances are it will be
patented, so long as that person has the sophistication and re-
sources to pursue patent rights.
Of course, resource constraints prohibit patenting many dis-
coveries that emerge from government-sponsored research. But
the discoveries that enter the public domain today are those that
slip through the net of present policy, whether through over-
sight or through a deliberate choice to allocate resources to
more promising commercial prospects. Only in exceptional cir-
cumstances does the statute acknowledge that there may be an
affirmative case for putting a discovery in the public domain for
the greater social good.
This is a counterintuitive policy in a number of respects.
First, by allowing private firms to hold exclusive rights to inven-
tions that have been generated at public expense, it seems to re-
quire the public to pay twice for the same invention-once
through taxes to support the research that yielded the invention,
and then again through higher monopoly prices and restricted
supply when the invention reaches the market. Second, by
calling for exclusive rights in inventions that have already been
made through public funding (and thus, presumably, without
the need for a profit incentive), it contravenes the conventional
935 U.S.C. §§ 202(a), (c)(2) (1994).
10 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (1994).
,, 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 3710d (1994).
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wisdom that patent rights on existing inventions result in a net
social loss ex post, a loss that we endure only to preserve ex ante
incentives to make future patentable inventions. Third, by
promoting the private appropriation of federally-sponsored re-
search discoveries as a matter of routine, it calls into question
the public goods rationale for public funding of research. And
fourth, by providing incentives to patent and restrict access to
discoveries made in institutions that have traditionally been the
principal performers of basic research, it threatens to impover-
ish the public domain of research science that has long been an
important resource for researchers in both the public and pri-
vate sectors. The first two of these intuitions-that patents will
require the public to pay twice for the same invention and that
patent incentives are unnecessary when the government has
paid for the research-were examined in some detail in the de-
bate leading to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. The last two,
however-that private appropriation undercuts the public goods
rationale for government research funding and that it impover-
ishes the public domain of research science-seem to have been
largely overlooked.
This Article revisits the logical and empirical basis for current
government patent policy in order to shed light on the compet-
ing interests at stake and to begin to assess how the system is
operating in practice. Such an inquiry is justified in part by the
significance of federally-sponsored research and development to
the overall U.S. research effort. Although the share of national
expenditures for research and development borne by the federal
government has declined since 1980, federal funding in 1995 still
accounted for approximately thirty-six percent of total national
outlays for research and development'2 and nearly fifty-eight
percent of outlays for basic research.'3 Federal policy concern-
ing the allocation of intellectual property rights in the results of
this research thus determines how a large portion of our
emerging knowledge is disseminated and utilized. If we are
mishandling intellectual property rights in the results of gov-
12 National Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators: 1996, at 4-6 to 4-7 &
107 app. tbl. 4-4. The comparable figure was 47% for 1980, the year in which the
Bayh-Dole Act was passed. See id. at 107 app. tbl. 4-4.
1 Id. at 108 app. tbl. 4-5. The comparable figure for 1980 was 70%. Id.
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ernment-sponsored research, the public may be failing to get full
value from its substantial investment of tax dollars in research.
But apart from the practical significance of the patent policy
that governs the results of federally-sponsored research as a
mechanism for achieving its own goals of technology transfer
and commercial development, it is also of interest because of
the light it sheds on the functions of the patent system generally.
When inventions are made with public funds, equitable argu-
ments for rewarding research performers with patent rights have
lesser force than when private firms have put their own capital
at risk to make the inventions, and instrumental arguments
about the impact of patents on innovation are brought to the
fore." A standard instrumental argument for patents empha-
sizes their role in providing incentives to invest in the costly and
risky enterprise of making inventions. 5 If competitors were free
to copy successful inventions without having shared in the initial
cost and risk of making them, inventing firms would be placed at
a competitive disadvantage. Free copying would reduce the
price consumers pay to enjoy the benefits of existing inventions,
but it would also reduce the incentive to make new inventions.
Thus we endure monopoly pricing of new inventions for a lim-
ited term in order to preserve incentives for firms to supply a
continuing stream of new inventions on the market.
This standard argument loses much of its force in the case of
inventions made with public funding. The public has paid for
these inventions and has absorbed the risk that nothing would
come of its investment. If existing inventions would be more
widely utilized if they were disseminated free of charge, and if
1'4The widespread willingness of employed inventors to surrender intellectual
property rights to their private sector employers suggests that an allocation of
intellectual property rights to research sponsors rather than to research performers is
not generally considered inequitable. Just as the contributions of private employers
reduce the equitable claims of employed inventors to any intellectual property that
comes out of their work, the contributions of government agencies reduce the
equitable claims of contractors and grantees as against the public.
15 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors 609, 616-19 (National Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962); William D.
Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of
Technological Change 70-73, 87-88 (1969).
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the government doesn't need to turn a profit on research in or-
der to continue supporting it, perhaps the public would benefit
more fully from the inventions it has paid for by putting them in
the public domain, and thereby reducing the price that consum-
ers pay for products based on the inventions in competitive
markets.
In responding to this argument, advocates of private appro-
priation of the results of government-sponsored research make
an interesting move. They set aside as secondary the standard
justification for patents as an ex ante incentive to make new in-
ventions, and shift the focus from the initial costs of making an
invention to the subsequent costs of developing an existing in-
vention into a commercial product. They argue that even after
an invention has been made, further investment is necessary to
refine it, test it, build the necessary facilities for production on a
commercial scale, and find or create a market for it. Through-
out this development process a substantial risk of failure re-
mains. These follow-on investments may greatly exceed the
value of the initial investment that created the invention in in-
choate form. The government lacks the expertise and facilities
to do this development work itself, and therefore needs to turn
the invention over to industry at this point. Firms may only be
willing to invest in the development of an invention if they hold
exclusive rights, either in the form of title or an exclusive li-
cense, under a patent. As in the case of firms that make inven-
tions, firms that develop inventions into commercial products
may feel that patent rights are necessary to protect them from
competition once the innovation proves successful. Inventions
that are freely available to all may never find their way into
commercial development.
If patents play a critical role in inducing firms to invest in
commercial development even after an invention has been
made, this could have important implications for the functions
of the patent system outside the context of public research.
There is some scholarly support for the view that the primary
significance of patents lies in their impact on subsequent re-
search and development within the new technological prospect
identified in the patent rather than in their impact on ex ante in-
1996] 1669
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centives to invent, 6 but this remains a minority view among pat-
ent scholars.'7 Evidence that this function of patent rights is im-
portant in the context of inventions made through public fund-
ing might help to refocus the attention of patent scholars on the
impact of patents on post-issuance incentives for commercial
development.
In this Article I examine the arguments that have been ad-
vanced in favor of private appropriation of the results of gov-
ernment-sponsored research as a mechanism for promoting
commercial development in public debates about government
patent policy. In addition to assessing the logic and limitations
of the arguments as a theoretical matter, I also offer some pre-
liminary observations about the empirical record of technology
transfer in the pre- and post-Bayh-Dole eras, with particular at-
tention to biomedical research. Biomedical research provides a
useful focus for a number of reasons. It is of significant interest
both to research scientists working in university and govern-
ment laboratories and to commercial firms, and thus provides a
wealth of new scientific discoveries that are potential candidates
for commercial development, as well as inputs into further re-
search. The obvious implications of these discoveries for human
health raise the stakes of getting the balance between private
property and public access right, particularly at a time when
public attention is riveted upon the rising costs of health care.
And advances in. biomedical research profoundly affect the in-
terests of the young biotechnology industry that has grown up in
the post-Bayh-Dole era as well as the more established pharma-
ceutical industry, thus offering an opportunity to test the impact
of present policy on two very different types of firms.
Nonetheless, I acknowledge at the outset that my conclusions
might be different if I were to make a similar investigation in
another field. Both the pharmaceutical industry and the bio-
technology industry are heavily dependent on patents, perhaps
16 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
Econ. 265 (1977).
1" For a thoughtful review and analysis of competing theories about the function of
patents and their underlying assumptions, see Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R.
Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents (Sept. 21, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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to a greater extent than firms in other industries. In biomedical
research fields researchers in government, university and com-
mercial laboratories are often working simultaneously on the
same problems, whether collaboratively or competitively, and
this may have important implications for technology transfer in
these areas that don't carry over into other fields where gov-
ernment-sponsored research more typically precedes commer-
cial interest in a problem. But current policy is quite deliber-
ately a unitary policy that applies the same rules to all agencies
and all fields. To the extent that the rules don't fit in this par-
ticular setting, it calls into question at the very least the impera-
tive for uniformity, even if the same rules may be working just
fine in other contexts.
I. HISTORY OF CURRENT POLICY
A review of the history of government patent policy over the
past half century reveals no golden age in which the results of
government-sponsored research were uncontroversially dedi-
cated to the public domain. The question of who should own ti-
tle to these research results has been the subject of heated de-
bate at least since World War II, when unprecedented levels of
federal spending on research and development to support the
war effort focused the attention of the federal government on
the issue.
A. Title Versus License
In 1941, President Roosevelt created the National Patent
Planning Commission by executive order to begin planning "for
a full utilization of the Nation's expanded industrial capacity
with the return of peace."' 8 That Commission offered an early
analysis of the role of patents in government-sponsored re-
search in its report, "Government-Owned Patents and Inven-
tions of Government Employees and Contractors," issued in
is 2 Subcommittee on Domestic and Int'l Scientific Planning and Analysis of the
House Comm. on Science and Tech., 94th Cong., Background Materials on
Government Patent Policies: Reports of Committees, Commissions, and Major
Studies xi (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Background Reports].
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January of 1945.29 In that document the Commission steered a
middle course between calling for the dedication of govern-
ment-sponsored research discoveries to the public domain and
calling for private ownership of such discoveries. Its primary
concern was to ensure that the government itself was free to use
the discoveries it had paid for rather than to make those discov-
eries available to the public, but it also addressed the issue of
preserving incentives for commercial development. The Com-
mission observed that the government can normally protect its
right to use inventions freely through prompt publication, but in
some cases the government may obtain greater protection
through filing patent applications.' The exclusionary rights con-
ferred by a patent were only of secondary concern to the Com-
mission. As a general rule, the Commission felt that the gov-
ernment should refrain from exercising the right to exclude
conferred by the patents it owns and should make the inven-
tions covered by its patents available for commercial and indus-
trial exploitation by anyone. In some cases, however, the
Commission recognized that it may be necessary for the gov-
ernment to offer an exclusive license in order to induce private
manufacturers to commercialize an invention. 1 The Commis-
sion therefore recommended that legislation be enacted author-
izing government agencies "to issue exclusive licenses in cases
where it seems evident that otherwise the inventions in question
will not come into general use."' As for inventions made by
government contractors, the Commission noted that the circum-
stances surrounding such inventions vary greatly, and that a sin-
gle set of uniform patent provisions for all government-
sponsored research would be neither feasible nor desirable.'
19National Patent Planning Commission, Government-Owned Patents and
Inventions of Government Employees and Contractors, reprinted in Background
Reports, supra note 18, at 1-12 (1945) [hereinafter Patent Planning Commission].
0 Id. at 3.
11 See id. at 4-5 (quoting a letter from Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, dated Oct. 28, 1941, for the proposition that if
the government lacks the authority to confer exclusive licenses under its patents,






Nonetheless, the Commission cautioned against full ownership
of patents by the government, except where private ownership
of such patents would conflict with the national interest.24
In sharp contrast to these carefully hedged recommendations
of the Commission, the Report of the Attorney General to the
President in 1947 recommended adoption of a uniform federal
policy placing full title to inventions made by government em-
ployees or contractors in the government, subject to parsimoni-
ously granted exceptions in emergency situations.' The primary
concerns of the Attorney General appear to have been to rec-
ognize the public's equitable claim to inventions made at public
expense and to avoid government favoritism toward particular
private firms.' The Attorney General recommended that ex-
ceptions to the general rule of government ownership be per-
mitted only when the contractor has made a substantial inde-
pendent contribution to a prospective invention prior to the
contract-a circumstance that would presumably strengthen the
equitable claim of the contractor relative to the public-and the
head of the agency certifies that reasonable efforts to find a con-
tractor who will do the work under the terms of the basic patent
policy have been unsuccessful.' Government-owned patents
should generally be made available to the public through non-
exclusive licensing or public dedication, and if nonexclusive li-
censes are not sufficiently lucrative to justify private investment
in subsequent promotion and development of the invention, the
government should finance these subsequent investments itself
rather than grant an exclusive license.' Otherwise, the govern-
ment would find itself playing inappropriate roles in selecting a
licensee from among numerous applicants, policing the licen-
see's operation, and detecting and prosecuting infringers. Nor,
in the view of the Attorney General, should the government
2Id.
Attorney General of the United States, Investigation of Government Patent
Practices and Policies: Report and Recommendations of the Attorney General to the
President, partially reprinted in Background Reports, supra note 18, at 15, 17-21
(1947) [hereinafter Attorney General's Report].
1
6See id. at 17, 19.
n Id. at 20.
21 Id. at 21.
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charge royalties for the use of technology that was paid for with
public funds. Further research should be financed through taxes
rather than through revenues from government-owned patents.2
These two positions framed the debate in the decades that
followed between advocates of a "license" policy, who urged the
government to limit itself to retaining a license to use the inven-
tions resulting from government-sponsored research, while
leaving title in the contractor, and advocates of a "title" policy,
who urged the government to acquire full title to the inven-
tions.' Arguments advanced on both sides of the debate over
ownership of patent rights in government-sponsored research
discoveries tended to echo broader debates about the merits of
the patent system generally. Advocates of a title policy gener-
ally feared that patent rights in the hands of government con-
tractors would lead to concentration of economic power in the
hands of large businesses, to the detriment of their smaller com-
petitors and consumers, and believed that, even in the absence
of exclusive rights under a patent, commercially significant re-
search discoveries made in the course of government-sponsored
research would be readily put to use by firms in competitive
markets.' Advocates of a license policy sang the praises of the
patent system as a stimulus to innovation, new products, and
new jobs, and believed that without the promise of title to pat-
ents, the best firms would not bid on government contracts,
would not bother to disclose the inventions they made with fed-
29 Id.
10 For further development of the positions in this debate, see James A. Dobkin,
Patent Policy in Government Research and Development Contracts, 53 Va. L. Rev.
564 (1967); William W. Eaton, Patent Problem: Who Owns the Rights?, Harv. Bus.
Rev., July-Aug. 1967, at 101; H. Fredrick Hamann, Federal Patent Policy: An
Instrument in the Regulation of Industry, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 491, 499-510 (1966);
William 0. Quesenberry, Government Patent Policy: Time for Compromise, IDEA,
Spring 1975, at 5; Philip Sperber, Government Contracting: Perpetuating the Energy
Crisis, 62 A.B.A. J. 1301 (1976); Symposium, Government Contract Patent Policy, 21
Fed. B.J. 3 (1961); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Need for a Uniform Government
Patent Policy: The D.O.E. Example, Harv. J.L. & Tech., Spring 1990, at 103; Donald
S. Watson, Harold F. Bright & Arthur E. Burns, Federal Patent Policies in Contracts
for Research and Development, 4 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. Res. & Educ. 295
(1960).
31 See, e.g., Hyman G Rickover, Government Patent Policy: Statement to the
Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate Small Bus. Comm., reprinted in 60 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 14 (1978) (Dec. 19, 1977).
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eral funds, and would not invest further in the development of
discoveries owned by the government. 2
Conspicuously absent from the debate were arguments for
leaving government-sponsored research discoveries unpatented.
Some advocates of a title policy expressed considerable mistrust
of patents, yet their bottom line was that the government should
hold title to patents and license them nonexclusively rather than
that they should forbear from obtaining patent rights in the first
place.3 That advocates of a license policy should favor patents
on the results of government-sponsored research is not surpris-
ing, but why would advocates of a title policy, who generally
oppose the granting of exclusive rights to such discoveries,
nonetheless favor patenting them?
One reason is to be sure that no one else may claim patent
rights in the discoveries. Otherwise, the government and other
consumers might be compelled to pay higher prices for the use
of discoveries that the public has already paid for through tax
dollars. This is not an entirely satisfactory response, inasmuch
as the government may generally prevent subsequent inventors
from obtaining a patent more cheaply by publishing the discov-
ery than by patenting it', and generally may not, under U.S. law,
patent a previously invented discovery,35 even if the same inven-
32 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 30, at 103-04 (recounting history of arguments);
Wilson R. Maltby, Need for a Federal Policy to Foster Invention Disclosures by
Contractors and Employees, 25 Fed. B.J. 32 (1965) (advocating adoption of a system
of rewards designed to promote disclosure); Sperber, supra note 30, at 1303-04
(advocating license policy).
33For example, the Attorney General's Report, supra note 25, reflects a
presumption in favor of patenting the results of government-sponsored research:
Patenting of Government inventions affords greater protection than
publication of the unpatented invention, and permits controls to be imposed in
appropriate cases upon the use of the invention.
As soon as an invention is completed under circumstances giving the United
States the right to any patent rights therein, it should be covered by a patent
application, unless the head of the agency finds that adequate protection of the
public interest may be had by reducing the invention to practice, publishing it,
and fully disclosing it to the Patent Office in such form as to make it a part of
the prior art.
Attorney General's Report, supra note 25, at 22.
4 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a),(b) (1994).
3$ See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
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tion was subsequently made again at public expense. But filing
a patent application ahead of a competitor gives the prior appli-
cant certain procedural advantages that may help in establishing
priority of invention in close cases.16 Moreover, even if a com-
petitor files first, a subsequent patent applicant may sometimes
prevail by proving an earlier date of "conception '37 for the in-
vention; a publication only defeats the patent claims of a com-
petitor as of the publication date, 8 which may be significantly
later than the conception date or even the patent filing date.
Thus filing a patent application may offer some marginal benefit
over publication as a means of preventing someone else from
obtaining patent rights when priority of invention is likely to
present a close question.
However trivial the benefits of patenting over publication as a
mechanism for ensuring public access to the results of federally-
sponsored research, it bears emphasis that advocates of a title
policy during this time period generally aimed to defeat exclu-
sive rights in the underlying inventions rather than to secure
them. They saw government ownership of patents as a way of
placing the underlying inventions in the public domain rather
than as a way of excluding others from using the inventions.
Congress did not follow the suggestion of the Attorney Gen-
eral to adopt a uniform policy vesting ownership of all federally-
sponsored research discoveries in the government, although
over the years it did enact such a policy on a more limited basis
in a number of statutes applicable to particular programs or
agencies. 9 Agencies not bound by such explicit statutes had
considerable discretion to choose whatever patent policy best
suited their missions. Not surprisingly, there was considerable
variation in the policies adopted by the different agencies.'
mThese procedural advantages are reviewed in 3 Donald S. Chisum, Patents: A
Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity and Infringement § 10.03[1][c], at 10-33
to 10-41 (1996).
3735 U.S.C. § 102(g); see also 3 Chisum, supra note 36, § 10.04, at 10-73 to 10-141
(on "conception").
38 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a),(b) (1994).
3" These statues are listed supra note 2.
-The policies of different agencies are collected in various sources. See 1
Subcommittee on Domestic and Int'l Scientific Planning and Analysis of the House
Comm. on Science and Tech., 94th Cong., Background Materials on Government
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Agencies that followed a title policy included the Atomic En-
ergy Commission and its successor agencies ("Energy"),4' the
Department of Agriculture ("Agriculture"), 2 the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"),4 3 the Department of
the Interior ("Interior"), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration ("NASA").4" Agencies that followed a li-
cense policy included the Department of Defense ("DoD")46
and the National Science Foundation ("NSF"). '7
B. The 1963 Presidential Memorandum
President Kennedy attempted to achieve a greater degree of
uniformity in government patent policy, subject to specific stat-
utes governing particular agencies, in a 1963 Presidential
Memorandum and Policy Statement.4' This policy statement,
the result of an intensive study by the Office of Science and
Technology with the help of those agencies having research and
development programs,4 9 took a middle ground between a title
policy and a license policy, attempting to balance the need for
private incentives to encourage development and use of inven-
tions against the need to promote competition in industry.' It
identified a number of circumstances that would call for title in
Patent Policies: Presidential Statements, Executive Orders, and Statutory Provisions
61-85 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Background Laws]; Ralph C. Nash, Jr. &
Leonard Rawicz, Patents and Technical Data 74-92 (1983); Dobkin, supra note 30, at
570-91.
"Energy was bound to follow a title policy under the terms of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2181 (1994).
42 Agriculture was bound to "mak[e] the results of research and investigations
available to the public through dedication, assignment to the Government, or such
other means as the Secretary shall determine" by the terms of the Agriculture
Research and Marketing Act of 1946, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 427i(a)
(1994), and a similar provision codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (1994).
43 Dobkin, supra note 30, at 580-81.
"Nash & Rawicz, supra note 40, at 78.
' Dobkin, supra note 30, at 574.
Id. at 586.
"Nash & Rawicz, supra note 40, at 79.
8 Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943-
10,946 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Presidential Memorandum].
4 Nash & Rawicz, supra note 40, at 92-93.
"1 1963 Presidential Memorandum, supra note 48, at 10,944.
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the government, including: (1) where a principal purpose of the
contract is to create products or processes intended for commer-
cial use by the general public; (2) where the research directly
concerns the public health or public welfare; (3) where there has
been little significant experience in the field outside of govern-
ment-funded research or the government has been the principal
developer of the field and the acquisition of exclusive rights
might confer on the contractor a dominant position in the field;
and (4) where the contractor is operating a government-owned
facility or coordinating and directing the work of others.
Heads of agencies and departments retained authority to allow
contractors to acquire greater rights than a non-exclusive li-
cense, either at the time of contracting or after the invention has
been identified, if "necessary... to call forth private risk capital
and expense to bring the invention to the point of practical ap-
plication."' On the other hand, where the contract research is
to build upon existing technology to develop information, prod-
ucts or processes for use by the government, and the contractor
has acquired technical competence and established a nongov-
ernmental commercial position in the field, the contractor
would normally acquire title, subject to a non-exclusive, royalty-
,, Id. at 10,944. The rationale for these exceptions is not entirely clear. Perhaps the
first exception, where a principal purpose of the contract is to create products
intended for commercial use by the general public, reflects a sense that the equitable
claim of the government to own what it has paid for is stronger when the patented
invention is something that the government deliberately set out to procure for the
public benefit than it is when the patented invention is an unintended byproduct of
research procured for some unrelated governmental purpose. The second exception,
where the research directly concerns the public health or welfare, seems to reflect a
concern that privately held patents will harm the public by restricting the availability
or raising the price of new medical advances or other discoveries of direct relevance
to the public welfare. The third exception, where the field has been dominated by
government-funded research and development and exclusive rights might confer a
dominant position on the contractor, seems to echo the concerns expressed in the
Attorney General's Report, supra note 25, that allowing contractors to retain patent
rights will lead to industrial concentration or put the government in the unseemly
position of favoring a particular contractor, while allowing for a different rule in cases
where there has been significant private sector R&D in the field. See Attorney
General's Report, supra note 25, at 19. The fourth exception, where the contractor is
operating a government-owned facility or coordinating and directing the work of
others, again appears to apply a title policy to cases in which the government's
contribution looms large relative to the contractor's.
52 1963 Presidential Memorandum, supra note 48, at 10,944.
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free license in the government. 3 Contractors retaining more
than a nonexclusive license were to provide written reports to
the government on their commercial use of the inventions, and
the government retained "march-in" fights to terminate their
exclusivity if they failed to take effective steps to bring the in-
vention to practical application within three years.' Govern-
ment-owned patents were to be made available "through dedi-
cation or licensing., 55  Finally, the 1963 Presidential
Memorandum called for the Federal Council for Science and
Technology ("FCST"), in consultation with the Department of
Justice, to prepare annual reports concerning the effectiveness
of the policy and to make recommendations for revision in light
of experience. 6
The 1963 Presidential Memorandum left agencies with con-
siderable discretion to handle patent policy as they saw fit and
did not bring about uniformity among agencies directly. But the
delegation to FCST of the authority to monitor and review im-
plementation and recommend changes led to further study of
the issue by government patent administrators and ultimately
created an organized constituency for law reform. In 1965,
FCST established a Committee on Government Patent Policy to
acquire and analyze information on the operation of the policy.
The Committee in turn commissioned Harbridge House to con-
duct an extensive study of federal patent policy.
C. The Harbridge House Study
The Committee asked Harbridge House to investigate the ef-
fect of patent policy on (1) industry participation in government
13 Id. at 10,945. If the contractor did not have a sufficiently established commercial
position in the field, the determination of rights ordinarily was to be deferred until
after the invention had been identified. Id.
s4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 10,946.
17 See Federal Council for Science and Technology, Combined Report on
Government Patent Policy 2 (Dec. 31, 1973; Dec. 31, 1974; Dec. 31, 1975; and Sept.
30, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 FCST Combined Report].
-8 See 1 Harbridge House, Government Patent Policy Study, Final Report for the




R&D programs; (2) commercial utilization of government-
sponsored inventions; and (3) business competition in commer-
cial markets.9 Harbridge House conducted an eighteen-month
empirical investigation and produced a four-volume report with
carefully hedged conclusions about each of these inquiries.
Much of the nuance was lost, however, in the significance at-
tached by others to the Harbridge House findings.
The authors of the Harbridge House report highlighted as
their most significant finding that commercial utilization of gov-
ernment-sponsored inventions was very low, regardless of who
held title: Only 12.4% of a sample of government-sponsored in-
ventions that were patented in the years 1957 and 1962 had ac-
tually been put to use, and only 2.7% of such inventions were
playing a critical role in the commercial products in which they
were incorporated.' Focusing more narrowly on the commer-
cial utilization of government-sponsored inventions by contrac-
tors with prior experience in the field of the invention, they
found that the rate of utilization was 23.8% when the contractor
held title to the invention and 13.3% when the contractor did
not hold title."1 Although these figures were subsequently in-
voked in justification of legislation granting contractors title to
government-sponsored inventions,62 it should be noted that
eighty-three percent of the contractor inventions included in the
Harbridge House data had been funded by DoD under con-
tracts and policies that would have permitted the contractors to
retain title if they had so elected. 3 The subset of inventions on
which the contractors did not hold exclusive rights were pre-
59 Id.
10 4 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 3-4.
61 Id. at 18 tbl. 15.
62 See, e.g., Government Patent Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Tech. of the House Comm. on Science and Tech., 96th Cong. 4 (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 House Patent Policy Hearings] (statement of Sen. Harrison H.
Schmitt); 1 Government Patent Policies: Institutional Patent Agreements: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly and Anticompetitive Activities of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 373-98 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate
Select Committee Hearings] (statement of Howard Bremer, Patent Counsel,
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation).
63 4 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 6 tbl. 2 (indicating that 2,862 out of




sumably those with the least commercial potential, and it is thus
unsurprising that they were not heavily utilized commercially.'
The Harbridge House authors concluded that their data could
not resolve the debate between advocates of a title policy and
advocates of a license policy on a uniform basis:
Significantly, the evidence does not indicate that either title or
nonexclusive licensing is uniformly the best way to promote
utilization. There are areas of technology where title is re-
quired for utilization; areas where title would inhibit it; and a
large area-inventions with no commercial application-where
neither title nor license will promote utilization.65
This conclusion was supported by the results of follow-up in-
terviews with contractors and licensees. These interviews re-
vealed that firms vary greatly in the importance they attach to
patent rights in making decisions about whether to participate in
government contracts and whether to develop commercial
products, and that other factors, such as the limited commercial
potential of the inventions, often dominate decisions about
commercial development.' The Harbridge House authors also
noted wide variation among government agencies in the nature
of their missions, the types of research they sponsor, and the
proximity of sponsored inventions to commercial applications,
as well as in the technological sophistication of the industries
most likely to make use of the inventions and the attitudes of
firms in such industries toward patents.
Although the Harbridge House authors did not endorse a
broad policy of leaving title to government-sponsored inven-
tions in the contractor, they indicated that granting exclusive
rights to contractors would promote utilization better than ac-
quisition of title by the government in some situations, including
"[w]here the invention is commercially oriented but requires
substantial private development to perfect it, applies to a small
"This was how the Committee on Government Patent Policy interpreted the data.
See Committee on Government Patent Policy of the Federal Council for Science and
Technology, Report and Recommendations on Government Patent Policy, reprinted
in Background Reports, supra note 18, at 143, 152 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 FCST
Patent Policy Report].
64 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 4.
"See id. at 42-55 (surveying predominant attitudes of firms in study).
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market, or is in a field occupied by patent sensitive firms and its
market potential is not alone sufficient to bring about utiliza-
tion."'67
D. The NIH Medicinal Chemistry Program
One of the most illuminating aspects of the Harbridge House
Report for purposes of understanding the role of patents in
biomedical innovation was a case study of the impact of NIH
patent policy in the 1960s on the willingness of pharmaceutical
firms to collaborate with investigators in universities and hospi-
tals who had developed new compounds in the NIH-funded
medicinal chemistry program." During the relevant time period
HEW regulations applicable to NIH gave the Assistant Secre-
tary for Health and Scientific Affairs broad authority to deter-
mine the disposition of patent rights in inventions arising from
sponsored research.69 Prior to 1962, pharmaceutical firms had
routinely screened compounds developed by NIH-funded inves-
tigators for biological activity, at no charge, without signing any
agreements with either the investigator or NIH regarding rights
to inventions discovered in the course of screening."
In 1962 NIH began requiring pharmaceutical firms to sign a
patent agreement before the firms could screen compounds de-
veloped with NIH funds.7 The agreement restricted the ability
of firms to disclose the results of testing, obligated them to re-
671 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at vii. This conclusion may be
particularly pertinent to a consideration of appropriate mechanisms for technology
transfer in biomedical research, inasmuch as such research often yields inventions
requiring substantial private development to bring to market, and the firms most
likely to undertake this development-biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical
firms-are highly patent sensitive.
61 Id. at 42-47; 2 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 2-40. This episode was
also thoroughly investigated and reported by the Comptroller General of the United
States. See Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress:
Problem Areas Affecting Usefulness of Results of Government-Sponsored Research
in Medicinal Chemistry, reprinted in 1978 Senate Select Committee Hearings, supra
note 62, at 103-46 (1968) (attachment 3 to the testimony of Norman Latker)
[hereinafter Comptroller General's Report on Medicinal Chemistry].
69The text of the regulations adopted in 1955, along with revisions in 1957 and
1958, is set forth at 2 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 4-8 fig. 11-3.
'1 Id. at 12.
1, Id. at 12-13 fig. 11-7.
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port all results promptly to the investigator for use by the Public
Health Service in filing patent applications, restricted the firms'
rights to obtain patents on new uses of the compounds, and gave
the government a nonexclusive, royalty-free license under the
firms' patents with the power to sublicense for governmental
purposes.' Prior to 1966, NIH also required that firms con-
tracting with NIH-funded investigators agree to license the gov-
ernment and other parties under any background patents neces-
sary to practice foreground inventions developed under the
contract."
The new agreement had a dramatic impact on collaborations
between pharmaceutical firms and NIH-funded investigators.
The firms almost unanimously rejected the agreement, citing
concerns about loss of prospective proprietary rights, contami-
nation of in-house research through exposure to government-
sponsored research, and loss of control over testing and report-
ing results.74 The firms stopped screening NIH-sponsored com-
pounds, resulting in an abrupt restriction in the sharing of in-
formation and materials between NIH investigators and
pharmaceutical firms, to the detriment of the medicinal chemis-
try program. 5 The situation was finally resolved in 1968, fol-
lowing an investigation by the Comptroller General of the
United States. In addition to revising the terms of the patent
agreements that had met with such strong resistance from
pharmaceutical firms, HEW agreed to use a revised standard
institutional patent agreement ("IPA") granting patent rights to
universities with approved patent policies so that the universi-
ties could transfer exclusive rights in new compounds to firms
for commercial development. 6
The Committee on Government Patent Policy analyzed the
results of the Harbridge House study in a 1968 report.' The
Committee concluded that "the study results provide no basis
7 Id. at 13 fig. II-7 (reproducing patent agreement).
3Id. at 14.
74 Id. at 15.
75 See id.
76 Comptroller General's Report on Medicinal Chemistry, supra note 68, at 109.
" See 1968 FCST Patent Policy Report, supra note 64, at 143-82.
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for changing the basic principles of the Presidential Policy,"'
and that "a single 'title' or 'license' policy would not be in the
public interest, whether applied to a government-wide policy or
to the policy of any particular agency."79  In particular, the
Committee found that the Harbridge House data generally sup-
ported the normal acquisition of title by the government when-
ever the purposes of the contract are "public-oriented."' It ex-
pressed concerns, in light of the Harbridge House report on the
reactions of the pharmaceutical firms to NIH's patent position
in its medicinal chemistry program, that the Presidential Memo-
randum and Policy Statement directing the government to take
title to inventions under contracts relating to public health or
public welfare might lead to "participation problems."8 Even
so, the Committee believed that these problems could be dealt
with under provisions of the Policy permitting departures from
the ordinary rule under "exceptional circumstances."'  None-
theless, the Committee recommended that the policy be modi-
fied to allow contractors to take title, or to allow the govern-
ment to grant exclusive licenses when it holds title, in
appropriate cases.
E. The 1971 Presidential Memorandum
President Nixon implemented the suggested changes in a re-
vised Presidential Memorandum and Policy Statement on gov-
ernment patent policy in 1971.' The revisions facilitated the al-
location of exclusive rights in government-sponsored inventions
to private firms in a number of ways. They clarified the author-
ity of government agencies to grant greater rights than a nonex-
clusive license, either to call forth private risk capital to bring
78 Id. at 143.
7Id. at 144.




14 Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887
(1971) [hereinafter 1971 Presidential Memorandum]. Differences between the 1963




the invention to practical application or to recognize the relative
equities of the contractor and the agency, even in cases where
the invention was not the primary object of the research con-
tract.' The revisions allowed the government to use its march-
in rights to compel contractors to grant exclusive as well as non-
exclusive licenses.' They allowed agencies to revoke nonexclu-
sive licenses held by contractors in order to grant exclusive li-
censes where necessary to encourage commercialization of the
inventionY Finally, they explicitly authorized exclusive licenses
under government-owned patents."
Meanwhile, further pressure to enhance mechanisms for pri-
vate appropriation of the results of government-sponsored re-
search came from the Commission on Government Procure-
ment, established by Congress in November 1969 to study and
recommend methods to promote the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of procurement by the Executive Branch of the
federal government. 9 Among the problem areas highlighted for
the attention of the Commission in the House Report accompa-
nying the legislation that set its mandate was the issue of patent
rights in government-sponsored inventions.' The House Report
explicitly noted that the 1963 Presidential Memorandum had
been given a mixed reception and that Congress had reviewed
the issues on occasion, without conclusive results.9' The 1971
Presidential Memorandum came down in the middle of the
Commission's brief tenure, and the Commission in its report to
Congress noted that "it is premature to disturb this latest effort
by the President to achieve a more workable patent policy."92




Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, §§ 1, 2, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. (83 Stat. 269)
293, 293-94. In 1972, the Commission delivered a four-volume report to Congress
containing 149 recommendations, including 16 recommendations pertaining to
patents, technical data and copyrights. See 1976 FCST Combined Report, supra note
57, at 5, 134-267 app. E. Portions of the Commission's 1972 report pertaining to
government patent policy are reprinted in Background Reports, supra note 18, at
185-206.
10 H.R. Rep. No. 91-468 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1350, 1377-1378.
9' Id. at 1378.
SCommission on Government Procurement, 1972 Report, partially reprinted in
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Nonetheless, the report makes plain that the Commission would
have gone much farther in the direction of leaving title to pat-
ents with contractors and promoting the exclusive licensing of
government-owned patents. Indeed, some of the language of
the report implies that the reason for implementing the 1971
Presidential Memorandum promptly was so that the process of
gathering data on its inadequacies could get underway.93
The Commission went on to sketch out an alternative ap-
proach to government patent policy to be considered "[i]f
evaluation of experience under the revised Presidential policy
indicates a need for further policy revisions."94 The alternative
approach would involve repealing all existing statutes governing
the allocation of patent rights in government-sponsored re-
search and enacting a uniform, government-wide policy through
legislation that would generally leave title in the contractor,
Background Reports, supra note 18, at 185, 192.
93 For example, the report states:
Reservations have been expressed as to whether the Presidential policy is the
optimum policy. A system which generally allows contractors or inventors to
obtain commercial rights subject to a strengthened march-in rights procedure
under the control of a central board may hold greater promise of fulfilling the
goals of patent policy. However, these reservations should await the test of
actual experience.
Experience may prove the Government should not routinely take principal
rights in all of the situations listed in section 1(a) of the Presidential policy.
Id. at 193-94. The Commission was particularly skeptical about the heavy reliance in
the 1971 Presidential Memorandum on the use of deferred determinations for
granting rights to contractors:
Reliance on deferred determinations and after-the-fact disposition of patent
rights has several potential shortcomings... [including] deferred utilization,
increased administrative costs, and a lessening in the willingness of some firms
to participate in Government research work.
More importantly, the long processing periods inherent in a deferred
determination policy will often delay prompt development and utilization of
Government-sponsored inventions, since a participating contractor would wish
to establish his rights before investing his risk capital. Utilization could also be
adversely affected by the administrative burden of petitioning the Government
for exclusive commercial rights and the probable requirement that the
contractor file patent applications to protect the property rights during the
petition period.




subject to a fortified system of government march-in rights.95
This policy would be subject to two exceptions. First, the
Commission saw no need for granting the contractor title or ex-
clusive fights in cases where the government intends to fund de-
velopment of the invention to the point of commercial applica-
tion." Second, in striking contrast to the ultimate terms of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the Commission noted that:
[I]f the contract is with an educational or other nonprofit or-
ganization utilization would not be fostered by granting the
contractor title unless it was determined that inventions likely
to flow from a given contract will be promoted in a manner
consistent with the objectives of utilization and maintenance of
competition.97
Thus, although the Commission was prepared to endorse a
presumption in favor of granting commercial rights in govern-
ment-sponsored inventions to commercial contractors at the
time of contracting, it was not willing to endorse the same a pri-
ori presumption in favor of universities.
In 1973 the Administrator of General Services promulgated
new regulations implementing the 1971 Presidential Memoran-
dum.98 While the new regulations were pending, a Justice De-
partment memorandum called into question their validity, ab-
sent legislative authorization, under a constitutional provision
reserving to Congress the power to dispose of property belong-
ing to the United States.99 Ralph Nader's organization Public
Citizen, Inc., filed lawsuits challenging provisions of the regula-
tions authorizing exclusive licensing of federally-owned pat-




See Federal Property Management Regulations Amendment, 38 Fed. Reg. 3328
(1973); Federal Procurement Regulations Amendment, 38 Fed. Reg. 23,782 (1973).
Department of Justice Memorandum from Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, on Constitutionality of Proposed Regulations Granting
Contractors Greater or Principal Rights in Patents Arising out of Government
Research and Development Contracts (Oct. 10, 1972), reprinted in 119 Cong. Rec.
40,417-20 (1973).
11o See Public Citizen v. Sampson, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (D.D.C. 1974).
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ment contracts. 1 Although both lawsuits were ultimately dis-
missed for lack of standing on the part of the plaintiffs," they
raised unresolved questions about the legality of achieving the
desired transformation in patent policy through administrative
regulations without new legislation. 3
Partly in response to these constitutional concerns and partly
in response to the recommendations of the Commission on
Government Procurement, the Committee on Government Pat-
ent Policy of the FCST prepared a draft bill to establish a uni-
form federal patent policy by statute.0 This uniform policy
would have given government contractors an option to acquire
patent rights on inventions made in the course of government-
sponsored research, °5 authorized exclusive licenses under gov-
ernment-owned patents,"° and codified the policy previously es-
tablished by executive order of vesting title to the inventions
made by government employees in the course of their employ-
ment in the government." This draft bill was forwarded to the
Office of Management and Budget and to the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, but the administration
never sought to introduce it in Congress." A similar bill was in-
' See Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974).
"12 One district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, invalidating
the regulations on the ground that they were not authorized by Congress. Public
Citizen v. Sampson, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 497 (D.D.C. 1974). This decision was
reversed without opinion on appeal. Public Citizen v. Sampson, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). A different district court judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of standing. Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974). This
disposition was affirmed without opinion on appeal. Public Citizen v. Sampson, 515
F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
, In 1976, another federal district court held invalid for lack of congressional
authorization Exec. Order No. 10,096, 15 Fed. Reg. 389 (1950), which called for
government ownership of inventions made by federal employees. Kaplan v. Johnson,
409 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1976). This decision was reversed on the merits on appeal.
Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1976).
14 See Federal Council for Science and Technology, Committee on Government
Patent Policy, Draft Bill Entitled "Federal Intellectual Property Policy Act of 1976,"
reprinted in 1976 FCST Combined Report, supra note 57, at 82-119 app. D.
10, Id. at 99-102 (§ 311 of the draft bill).
106 Id. at 108 (§ 401(c) of the draft bill).
107 Id. at 104-05 (§ 322 of the draft bill).
1-The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 51 (1979) [hereinafter Senate
Bayh-Dole Hearings] (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the
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troduced by Representative Thornton in the 95th Congress"
but no hearings were held on it."'
F. The Domestic Policy Review and President Carter's
Industrial Innovation Program
Further support for legislation to promote the private appro-
priation of government-sponsored research results came from
the Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation, initiated
by President Carter in 1978 to identify and recommend Gov-
ernment actions to encourage increased industrial productivity
and innovation."1 ' The Industrial Advisory Subcommittee on
Patent and Information Policy, a group created as part of the
Domestic Policy Review and consisting primarily of patent law-
yers from industry,"' recommended that commercial rights to
government-supported research be transferred to the private
sector, either through transfer of title or through exclusive li-
censes to patents, subject to a nonexclusive license in the gov-
ernment."3 The Subcommittee generally objected to govern-
ment ownership of patents, indicating that the government
could disclose information to the public through publication
without obtaining patents,"' that "the Government obtains pat-
ents on technology which, in the opinion of the private sector,
does not provide an attractive business opportunity, ' 5 and that
if the government stopped filing patent applications it would
United States).
119 H.R. 6249, 95th Cong. 1 (1977).
HO Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 51 (statement of Elmer B. Staats,
Comptroller General of the United States).
- See Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, Industrial Advisory
Subcommittee on Patent and Information Policy, Report on Patent Policy (1979),
reprinted in Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation: Final Report, at 147
(1979) [hereinafter Domestic Policy Review Final Report], and in House Hearings on
President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 787 app.1.
-The membership list is set forth in House Hearings on President's Industrial
Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 788 app. 1.
H Domestic Policy Review Final Report, supra note 111, at 155-56; House Hearings
on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 797-98 app.1.
114 Domestic Policy Review Final Report, supra note 111, at 156; House Hearings on
President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 797 app.1.
- Domestic Policy Review Final Report, supra note 111, at 156; House Hearings on
President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 798 app.1.
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free up resources of the Patent and Trademark Office that could
be redirected toward reducing its backlog.1 6
The work of the Domestic Policy Review culminated in an
October 31, 1979, address to Congress by President Carter, in
which he announced his administration's support for legislation
setting a uniform government patent policy as part of a wide-
ranging initiative to promote industrial innovation."7 The ad-
ministration's ultimate proposal did not go quite as far as the
Industrial Advisory Subcommittee on Patent and Information
Policy would have wished, but it did provide for the retention of
patent ownership in the results of government-sponsored re-
search by small businesses and universities, and exclusive li-
censes to other contractors in specific fields of use that they
agreed to commercialize, all subject to a nonexclusive license
and march-in rights in the government."'
The provisions restricting the rights acquired by large busi-
ness contractors, aimed at forestalling concerns about the im-
pact of the change on economic concentration in industry,"9
drew opposition from groups in the bar' and industry, who fa-
vored allowing all government contractors, large or small, to re-
tain patent ownership.'2 ' Thus the treatment of large business
contractors presented a political dilemma. On one hand, al-
16 Domestic Policy Review Final Report, supra note 111, at 157, House Hearings on
President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 798-99 app.1. Even for
inventions made by government employees at government expense, the
Subcommittee members were "divided about equally between those who feel that the
government employee should have title to the invention, and those who feel that such
inventions should be transferred to an independent, nongovernmental
organization,. . . or auctioned to the private sector or transferred to the private sector
in some other manner." Domestic Policy Review Final Report, supra note 111, at
156; House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at
798 app. 1.
"1 Industrial Innovation Initiatives: Message to the Congress on Administration
Actions and Proposals, Pub. Papers 2070, 2071 (Oct. 31, 1979).
See H.R. 6933, 96th Cong., §§ 383, 384, 386, 387 (1980).
House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at
17, 19 (testimony of Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division).
120 Id. at 125 & 159 app. 3 (statement of Donald R. Dunner, President, American
Patent Law Association).
2, Id. at 555, 557 (statement of Dr. James D. D'lanni, President, American
Chemical Society).
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though these contractors often retained title to patents under
prevailing administrative practice, particularly when the funding
agency was DoD, any legislative endorsement of this practice
was vulnerable to challenge as a giveaway of government rights
to wealthy corporations at the expense of consumers and tax-
payers. On the other hand, legislation that gave large business
contractors less than full title to patents would leave many con-
tractors worse off than before, and was thus sure to draw oppo-
sition from industry trade groups and their patent lawyers.
G. The Bayh-Dole Bill
Meanwhile a different approach, focusing exclusively on small
business and non-profit contractors, passed the Senate in a bill
introduced by Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole." The
Bayh-Dole bill made no provision at all for large business con-
tractors, whose rights would continue to be determined under
the policies of the various agencies funding their research. Ac-
cording to a contemporary newspaper account, the sponsors of
the bill said that to include large businesses would invite auto-
matic defeat of the bill in response to consumer advocates and
antitrust lawyers1 3
Apparently the immediate trigger for introduction of the
Bayh-Dole bill was frustration on the part of universities with
changes in the way HEW and DoD handled patent rights in
their inventions. The change at HEW followed a relatively
harmonious decade after the agency responded in the late 1960s
to sharp criticism from the General Accounting Office of its
handling of patent rights in the NIH medicinal chemistry pro-
gram.'24 The agency response was to allow universities with ap-
proved technology transfer capabilities to retain title to patents
5" S. 414, 96th Cong. (1980).
123 Bradley Graham, Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation, Wash. Post, Apr.
8, 1979, at M1, reprinted in Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 29-30.
This account was included in the record at the request of Senator Dole, in the
presence of Senator Bayh. See id. at 28-29.
124 See Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 52, 57 (letter from Elmer B.
Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, to Sen. Birch Bayh, July 17, 1979,
and enclosed summary of patent policies and practices of agencies). This episode is
discussed supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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and to grant exclusive licenses to industry under the terms of In-
stitutional Patent Agreements ("IPAs").'" IPAs conferred
rights in universities on a prospective basis, without the need for
case-by-case requests for a government waiver after an inven-
tion had been made, thereby eliminating uncertainty and bu-
reaucratic delays for universities that sought patent rights.
Then, in a 1978 draft report, HEW's Office of General Coun-
sel recommended that use of IPAs" be reconsidered on the
ground that they encourage exclusive licensing and thereby limit
the agency's control over the availability and cost of HEW-
supported inventions.'26 Around the same time, the HEW gen-
eral counsel's office began taking longer to review case-by-case
requests for a waiver of government patent rights after inven-
tions had been made. These developments caused concern that
HEW might be reverting to its pre-1968 policies" and created
pressure for legislation that would make permanent and nondis-
cretionary the arrangements that the agency had previously im-
plemented on a discretionary basis.
The change in DoD policy took place against the backdrop of
an agency policy that generally allowed contractors with an es-
tablished commercial position in the field to retain title to pat-
ents prospectively under the terms of their contracts." The dis-
tinction between contractors with and without an established
commercial position in the field tracked the language in Sec-
tion 1(b) of the 1963 and 1971 Presidential Memoranda on pat-
ent policy. This policy satisfied commercial contractors, but it
left universities unhappy because, lacking an established com-
mercial position, they had to seek patent rights on a deferred
basis after inventions had been identified and disclosed. For
years DoD got around this difficulty by using a "special situa-
125 See Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 37 (testimony of Elmer B.
Staats, Comptroller General of the United States). See generally The Role of the
Federal Laboratories in Domestic Technology Transfer: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech. of the House Comm. on Science and
Tech., 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter The Role of Federal Laboratories] (discussing
technology transfers between federal labs, private industry, and universities).
,26 See Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 37, 48 (testimony of Elmer B.
Staats, Comptroller General of the United States).
", Id. at 37.
128 This discussion is drawn from the testimony of Elmer B. Staats. Id. at 38, 60-62.
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tions" provision in the Presidential Memoranda to put a title-in-
contractor clause in contracts with qualifying universities and
nonprofit institutions who had approved patent policies. But
the regulations were revised in August of 1975 to discontinue
the "special situations" exception."29 Under the new rules uni-
versities had to show an established technology transfer pro-
gram in the particular field of technology of the sponsored re-
search, not merely an approved patent policy, in order to get
prospective title retention clauses in contracts. The result was
an eighty percent increase in deferred determinations of title to
inventions for DoD in 19762" Requests for title were generally
approved, but they took time, and the additional bureaucratic
hurdle was annoying to universities."'
The Bayh-Dole approach was popular with universities, who
claimed that a clear policy giving them patent rights at the time
of contracting would facilitate their efforts to transfer technol-
ogy to industry. It was also popular with small businesses, who
justified their favored position under the bill on the grounds
that they received discriminatory treatment under the prevailing
discretionary policies of the various agencies, that they were in
fact more innovative than their larger competitors, and that pat-
ent rights would allow them to compete more effectively with
larger firms.'32 Large businesses and their representatives would
have preferred legislation that granted them comparable
rights,'33 but they were often able to obtain such rights from their
129 Id. at 60.
Id. at 62.
See id. at 38, 60-62.
3 See, e.g., House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra
note 3, at 241-75 (testimony of Eric P. Schellin, National Small Business Association,
Small Business Legislative Council, American Society of Inventors, and National
Patent Council); Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 95-110 (testimony of
Patrick J. lannotta, President, Ecolotrol, Inc.; Arthur S. Obermayer, President,
Moleculon Research Corp.; and Walter D. Syniuta, President, Advanced Mechanical
Technology, Inc.).
0' See House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3,
at 95-96 (testimony of Donald R. Dunner, President, American Patent Law
Association); id. at 632-33 (testimony of Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., General Patent
Counsel, General Electric Co.); id. at 863, 872 (statement of the National Association
of Manufacturers); id. at 897 (letter from Robert A. Roland, President, Chemical
Manufacturers Association, to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman,
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sponsoring agencies under existing administrative policy, and at
least for the time being they were unable to obtain them from
Congress. A proposed amendment to the Bayh-Dole bill that
would have granted title to large business contractors was de-
feated by a vote of 60-34 in the Senate."4 Even without such a
provision, the new law would do nothing to worsen the position
of large businesses, and it might open the door to expanding its
provisions to cover them in the future.
The Carter administration argued unsuccessfully that an om-
nibus bill was needed to properly balance tradeoffs among com-
peting interests."35 The Bayh-Dole bill was only a partial solu-
tion that did nothing to unify patent policy across agencies;
indeed, if the rights of large contractors were still to be gov-
erned by the inconsistent practices and policies of the various
agencies, a new set of statutory rules applicable only to non-
profit institutions and small businesses would merely add a
twenty-seventh policy to the twenty-six inconsistent sets of rules
and regulations already on the books.36
But the Bayh-Dole Act as passed by Congress was silent on
the rights of large business contractors. And although bills
aiming to unify the treatment of large and small contractors
were introduced in subsequent Congresses,'37 to this day it is
only by virtue of a Memorandum to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies signed by President Reagan in
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, June 2, 1980).
114 Letter from Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Small
Bus., to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (June 9,
1980), reprinted in House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program,
supra note 3, at 877-78.
DI House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at
42 (testimony of Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division).
,3, House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3, at
618 (testimony of Jordan J. Baruch, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Office of
Productivity, Technology, and Innovation).
'"ISee, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-381 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Senate Patent Policy
Report]; The Uniform Science and Technology Research and Development
Utilization Act: Hearings on H.R. 5003 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research
and Tech. of the House Comm. on Science and Tech., 98th Cong. 4 (1984)




1983,138 and quietly endorsed by Congress in an inconspicuous
housekeeping provision to a 1984 change in the law,139 that large
business contractors enjoy the benefits that Congress explicitly
provided only for small businesses and nonprofit organizations
under the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act.
II. JUSTIFYING THE POLICY
A. Preferential Treatment of Nonprofit and Small Business
Contractors
The focus on universities and small businesses as recipients of
title to government-sponsored discoveries may have been pri-
marily a matter of political expediency, but the distinction be-
tween these contractors and others was justified in the hearings
on more principled grounds. The Carter administration argued
that universities and small businesses would have stronger in-
centives than large businesses to promote widespread commer-
cialization of inventions, and that they typically would not have
sufficient market power for their acquisitions of title to raise an-
titrust concerns."4 Senator Bayh noted that the practice of ob-
taining case-by-case waivers of title from the sponsoring agency
created more of a hardship for nonprofit institutions and small
businesses than for large companies because of the disparity in
resources available to them.''
Much of the testimony in favor of allowing small businesses to
retain patent rights stressed the superiority of small firms over
large firms in developing new technologies and the importance
of patent rights in protecting the market position of innovative
Im Government Patent Policy Memorandum, supra note 8, at 248 ("To the extent
permitted by law, agency policy with respect to the disposition of any invention made
in the performance of a federally-funded research and development contract, grant
or cooperative agreement award shall be the same or substantially the same as
applied to small business firms and nonprofit organizations under Chapter 38 of Title
35 of the United States Code.").
- See infra note 169.
10 See House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra note 3,
at 36-37 (testimony of Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division).
0, Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 41 (Sen. Bayh's response to
testimony of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States).
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smaller firms against unfair competition from big firms. Small
business was the white knight of the Carter administration's
strategy for improving the industrial competitiveness of the na-
tion. It was pictured as innovative, adaptive, risk-taking, entre-
preneurial and competitive, yet consistently underrated by
funding agencies in their allocations of research dollars and pat-
ent rights.'42 Large business, by contrast, was pictured as short-
sighted, risk-averse, and predatory, more likely to suppress new
technologies than to adopt them, yet savvy and powerful in their
dealings with government agencies and therefore more success-
ful than their more worthy small business competitors in gar-
nering government research contracts and securing patent rights
in the results.' Granting patent rights to small businesses
would enhance competition by allowing innovative firms to
compete more effectively with the sluggish behemoths whose
short-sightedness had led to a decline in the position of U.S. in-
dustry in world markets.'
But beyond these broad generalizations, the arguments for
leaving title in universities were for the most part quite different
from the arguments for leaving title with small business contrac-
tors. A careful consideration of the arguments suggests that, as
research performers and as patent holders, small business con-
tractors have more in common with large business contractors
than they do with universities, and universities have more in
common with the government than they do with small busi-
nesses.
14 5
The primary case for allowing small business contractors to
-,
2 See, e.g., id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
141 See, e.g., id. at 95-105 (testimony of Patrick J. lannotta, President, Ecoltrol, Inc.;
Arthur S. Obermayer, President, Moleculon Research Corp.; and Walter D. Syniuta,
President, Advanced Mechanical Technology, Inc.).
I4 See, e.g., id. at 259 (statement of Eric P. Schellin, National Small Business
Association) ("If big business in the U.S. is so innovative, why do I drive a foreign
made car, own a foreign made camera, and watch a foreign made T.V.... [B]ig
business has only a limited ability to be innovative. Therefore, we of small business
see no good reason to reward failure.").
145 Although the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act made allies of universities and small
business with respect to government patent policy, these two groups had opposing
interests in other features of the Carter administration's Industrial Innovation
Program, such as the proposal to require agencies funding research to set aside a
portion of their budgets for research contracts with small businesses.
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retain title to patents rested not on the superiority of small busi-
ness to large business, but rather on the importance of exclusive
rights in a discovery to motivate commercial development and
the uncertainty and bureaucratic burden involved in attempting
to obtain such rights from the government on a case-by-case ba-
sis after the fact. Although in theory a government agency
holding title to a patent could choose the licensee that offers the
most promise of successfully developing the invention into a
commercial product, agencies might not be trusted to get the
property into the right hands. Government agencies that are
not directly involved in commercial development might lack a
clear understanding of the commercial potential of the inven-
tions that they own and motivation to find licensees. Moreover,
whenever a government agency has discretion to make case-by-
case decisions, delays and uncertainty are inevitable, creating
administrative costs and reducing the willingness of firms to
commit resources promptly to commercial development of in-
ventions.
Nor is it clear that as a general matter there is much to be
gained by giving the funding agency authority to designate a li-
censee other than the contractor. Some witnesses observed that
the firm that makes a discovery is generally in a better position
to develop it commercially than other firms that do not employ
the inventor or have ready access to the unpatented know-how
associated with the discovery, and also better motivated to do
so.' 6 When the government holds a patent on a discovery made
by a contractor, all the government cap offer to a potential li-
censee (other than the contractor) is naked patent rights, which
in many cases will be inadequate to achieve meaningful tech-
nology transfer in the absence of further technical information
and ongoing contact with the inventor. Allowing commercial
contractors to retain title to inventions would automatically vest
"6See, e.g., House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra
note 3, at 163 app. 3 (appendix to the statement of Donald R. Dunner, President,
American Patent Law Association) ("An invention is like a baby that requires a lot
of loving care and attention to raise it to the point where it can be self-sufficient and
productive. An invention is not going to reach the commercial market place without
a considerable amount of effort on someone's part. This effort is most likely to be
expended by its creators, the contractor.").
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exclusive rights in the firm that is probably best able to bring the
discovery to market, while eliminating the government as a
middleman. Historically, the government has often licensed in-
ventions on which it holds title nonexclusively to anyone who
seeks a license, thereby diluting or eliminating incentives to de-
velop patented inventions. Moreover, if the government stands
in the position of licensor, it may use the license terms to impose
unwelcome regulations on the developing firm, or at the very
least to extract royalties that would amount to a tax on product
development.
These are powerful arguments for granting title to commer-
cial contractors, but they would seem to apply to both large and
small business contractors, while having limited relevance to
universities and other nonprofit organizations that, like the gov-
ernment, do not develop commercial products themselves. If an
invention is born in the private sector, there is much to be said
for a presumption in favor of letting it stay there, in the hands of
the firm that will generally have the best understanding of its
potential and the strongest motivation to put it to use, without
imposing any further bureaucratic barriers or royalty obligations
that might impede product development.
But what about an invention that was not made at an institu-
tion with the resources and capabilities to develop it into a
commercial product? If title to a patent is held by a noncom-
mercial institution, the discovery will have to be transferred to
the private sector for commercial development, whether the
patent holder is the government or a university. If technology
transfer will be necessary in either case, is there any reason to
believe that commercial development will be more likely if pat-
ent rights are owned by the university or other non-profit insti-
tution at which the invention was born than if they are owned
by the government?
The argument for allowing universities to retain patent rights
stressed the role of patents in facilitating technology transfer be-
tween academic laboratories and the private sector. Like the
government, universities are not in a position to develop new
discoveries into commercial products, but need to attract com-
mercial licensees to invest in further development. University-
owned patent rights would facilitate this process in part by pro-
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viding a source of exclusive rights to assure private firms that
successful products would be profitable. University-based dis-
coveries were presented as particularly risky candidates for
commercial development because they were byproducts of basic
research and therefore farther removed from commercial appli-
cations than discoveries made by commercial contractors in in-
dustrial laboratories.1 47
This analysis may call for patenting inventions made in the
course of government-supported research and offering exclusive
rights under such patents to firms that are willing to develop
them into marketable products, but it is not obvious why it calls
for placing title to patents in the university rather than the gov-
ernment. Much of the testimony in opposition to government
ownership focused on the poor track record of the government
in getting its patent portfolio licensed for commercial develop-
ment. At least one university representative contrasted this
poor performance of the government with university success in
attracting commercial licensees for those discoveries that they
owned under the terms of IPAs.'4 Some witnesses attributed the
difference to reluctance on the part of the government to extend
exclusive licenses, which made commercial development un-
profitable,' 49 or to the time lags and uncertainty associated with
obtaining licenses from government bureaucracies,'" or to con-
cern that firms would lose their exclusive position under their
own background patent rights if they got involved in developing
technologies related to government-sponsored research,'5' or to
general mistrust of the government as a licensor.'52
"47 See 1978 Senate Select Committee Hearings, supra note 62, at 307 (testimony of
Thomas F. Jones, Vice President for Research, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology).
'4 See, e.g., House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra
note 3, at 287-88, 354 (testimony of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation).
"I See, e.g., The Role of Federal Laboratories, supra note 125, at 621-22 (statement
of W. Novis Smith, Director of Research and Development, Thiokol Corp.).
1. See, e.g., Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 124-25 (response to
Sen. Bayh's written questions by Arthur S. Obermayer, President, Moleculon
Research Corp.).
- See, e.g., id. at 95-98 (testimony of Patrick J. Iannotta, President, Ecolotrol, Inc.).
'1 See, e.g., House Hearings on President's Industrial Innovation Program, supra
note 3, at 293, 361-62 (testimony of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wisconsin
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Universities also argued that they were better able than the
government to transfer inventions made by their researchers to
the private sector because they had greater familiarity with the
inventions and better access to university inventors. Direct in-
teraction between the inventor and the licensee is often neces-
sary to insure effective technology transfer; universities are bet-
ter able than government funding agencies to bring this
interaction about.53 University ownership of patents, with the
prospect of earning royalties for the university and the inventor,
would also motivate university researchers to invest time and
energy in technology transfer." University researchers were
pictured as primarily interested in the rewards of open publica-
tion, with only limited interest in patents and collaboration with
industry. Getting them to file patent disclosures requires work
on the part of their institutions, and universities might be less
willing to go to the trouble if they did not stand to profit from
their patents. Finally, when universities are assured of patent
rights in the results of federally-sponsored research, it is easier
for them to attract industrial funding for related research on
campus, because industrial sponsors need not be concerned that
they will lose the rights to develop any commercially interesting
discoveries that come out of the research (or background patent
rights in their own prior research in the area) because of gov-
ernment patent policy.55 Leaving title with universities would
thus not only facilitate technology transfer, but would also en-
courage industry to share in the costs of university-based re-
search.'56
Curiously, although much was made of the barriers to product
development arising from the unwillingness of the government
to enter into exclusive licenses, some universities indicated that
Alumni Research Foundation).
1" 1978 Senate Select Committee Hearings, supra note 62, at 311 (testimony of
Thomas F. Jones, Vice President for Research, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology).
19 Id. at 378-79 (testimony of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation).
- See id. at 309 (testimony of Thomas F. Jones, Vice President for Research,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).




they also preferred nonexclusive licenses and that significant
portions of their patent portfolios were licensed on a nonexclu-
sive basis.'" Some supporters of the Bayh-Dole bill also indi-
cated with approval that universities would have stronger incen-
tives than large businesses to promote widespread utilization of
research results.58
This suggests a further argument for title in universities that is
somewhat at odds with the arguments based on the importance
of exclusive rights in motivating product development. To the
extent that opponents of private appropriation feared that
vesting ownership of important discoveries in a single firm
would inhibit the dissemination of new knowledge, they might
be less troubled by university ownership of patents in view of
the general inclination of universities toward widespread dis-
semination of new knowledge. Of course, when a university li-
censes its patents nonexclusively, it is hard to see how the pat-
ents are doing anything to increase the motivation of firms to
develop commercial products; presumably product development
would be at least as profitable if the nonexclusively licensed in-
ventions were freely available in the public domain. Nonethe-
less, for some inventions the incentive effects of vesting exclu-
sive rights in a single firm might not be worth the foregone
benefits to the overall research enterprise of more widespread
dissemination, and universities might be more likely than pri-
vate firms to recognize these cases and handle them appropri-
ately through nonexclusive licensing.
'57 See id. at 311 (statement of Thomas F. Jones, Vice President for Research,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on the preference of M.I.T.); id. at 348
(statement of Arthur A. Smith, Counsel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
(same); id. at 346-47 (statement of Clark A. McCartney, Director of Contracts and
Grants, University of Southern California) (on the preference of U.S.C.); id. at 390
(statement of Howard W. Bremer, Patent Counsel, Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation) (on the preference of the University of Wisconsin).
"' See, e.g., Government Patent Policy Act of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 5715 Before
the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech. of the House Comm. on Science and
Tech., 96th Cong. 6 (1980) [hereinafter Government Patent Policy Act Hearings]
(statement of Jordan Baruch, Assistant Secretary of Science and Technology,
Department of Commerce).
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B. The Statistical Argument Against Government Ownership
For both nonprofit institutions and business contractors, the
primary argument against government ownership of patents was
a statistical one. The government, according to the testimony of
numerous witnesses, had a poor track record of getting its ex-
tensive patent portfolio transferred to industry for commercial
development. Only a small percentage of its estimated 28,000-
30,000 patents had been successfully licensed and exploited
commercially. 9 Thus, it was argued, because of government
ownership the results of government-sponsored research were
languishing in the archives.
But the statistical evidence presented was inadequate to
document this claim. For one thing, as noted above," the gov-
ernment patent portfolio that provided the basis for this argu-
ment reflected a huge selection bias; it consisted largely of in-
ventions made by contractors whose research was sponsored by
DoD."6' Under the terms of these research contracts and appli-
cable regulations, the contractors generally could have retained
title to the patents if they had wanted to do so.62 Thus the pat-
5 See, e.g., Science and Technology Research Hearings, supra note 137, at 2
(opening statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.); Senate Bayh-Dole
Hearings, supra note 108, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); id. at 28
(opening statement of Sen. Robert Dole); id. at 32 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch); id. at 46 (testimony of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the
United States) (citing 1978 Federal Council for Science and Technology report on
government patent policy); id. at 100-01 (testimony of Walter D. Syniuta, President,
Advanced Mechanical Technology, Inc.); id. at 150 (testimony of Betsy Ancker-
Johnson, Vice President of General Motors for the Environmental Activities Staff);
1979 House Patent Policy Hearings, supra note 62, at 4 (statement of Sen. Harrison
H. Schmitt).
110 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
161 See Federal Counsel for Science and Technology, Committee on Government
Patent Policy, Data Collection and Analysis Subcommittee, Statistical Report,
reprinted in 1976 FCST Combined Report, supra note 57, at 385 app. J. That report
indicated that out of an estimated 28,021 unexpired U.S. patents owned by the
government as of the end of fiscal year 1976, 17,632, or 63% of the portfolio, were
from the DoD, an agency that generally allowed its contractors to retain title. Id. at
440-41 tbl. I. Given that the patents remaining in the government's portfolio
consisted largely of those that had already been rejected by the contractors who had
made the discoveries, it is not surprising that only 282 of these patents, or 1%, were
licensed. Id.




ents held by the government were for the most part those that
industry had already passed up, in all likelihood because of their
limited applicability to civilian commercial needs. It is hardly
surprising that few firms were interested in taking licenses from
the government to patents that had already been rejected by
contractors that could have owned them outright if they had
found them at all commercially interesting."6 3 Rather than at-
tributing the low licensing rate to government ownership or to
the unavailability of exclusive licenses, one might ask why such
commercially irrelevant inventions were patented at all. 16
Agencies that were more reluctant than DoD to part with title
to inventions were more successful in licensing their presumably
more valuable patent portfolios, although their holdings ac-
counted for a lesser portion of the overall government patent
portfolio. For example, 325 of the 28,000 patents in the gov-
ernment's portfolio were from HEW, and seventy-five (or
twenty-three percent) of these HEW patents were licensed as of
the end of fiscal year 1976.165
Second, the number of patent licenses may be a misleading
measure of utilization of inventions in that it overlooks both
unlicensed development of patented inventions and develop-
ment or commercial utilization of unpatented inventions. The
former point was recognized by a number of the more thought-
ful and candid observers of the government's patent licensing
record. Indeed, the 1968 Harbridge House Study acknowledges
in a footnote that it was "common knowledge that government-
6 See Government Patent Policy Act Hearings, supra note 158, at 7 (testimony of
Jordan Baruch, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of
Commerce) ("The Government's patent portfolio is largely composed of patents that
contractors chose not to claim, patents that were felt not to be useful even for their
own business.").
114 A number of government witnesses conceded as much in response to questions
about what should be done with the government's existing patent portfolio to
promote utilization of the underlying inventions. See, e.g., Science and Technology
Research Hearings, supra note 137, at 8 (testimony of D. Bruce Merrifield, Assistant
Secretary for Productivity, Technology and Innovation, Department of Commerce)
("Unfortunately, most of those patents are not very valuable. They should not have
ever been filed; they are defensive patents that are not necessary, and that's a
different problem, but also many of them now are no longer relevant in the sense that
new technology has superseded [sic] them.").
11- 1976 FCST Combined Report, supra note 57, at 440 tbl. 1.
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owned inventions may be used without a formal license," and
that it was therefore "probable that more inventions are being
used than are noted in government records, although no data
were available as to the exact number.' 66 Also unavailable, of
course, are data on the utilization of unpatented government-
sponsored discoveries by industry.
The same statistics on the low licensing rate for government-
owned patents continued to be cited after passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act in support of legislation to extend the title-in-
contractor policy to other research performers.'67 Congress
passed a series of amendments to the Bayh-Dole Act in 1984 ex-
tending its provisions to inventions originating at government-
owned, contractor-operated facilities, repealing limitations on
the permissible duration of licenses from nonprofit organiza-
tions to large businesses on government-sponsored inventions,
and quietly endorsing President Reagan's memorandum ex-
tending the benefits previously provided only to small busi-
nesses and nonprofit organizations to all contractors. ' The ac-
companying committee report noted with approval the success
of universities in licensing their patents and entering into col-
'6 1 Harbridge House Report, supra note 58, at 7 n.6.
167 See, e.g., 1982 Senate Patent Policy Report, supra note 137, at 3; Science and
Technology Research Hearings, supra note 137, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr.).
, Although the statutory provisions continue to distinguish between the rights to
be accorded to small business and nonprofit contractors and other contractors,
Congress indirectly endorsed the uniform treatment of all contractors under the
terms of the Government Patent Policy Memorandum, supra note 8, by amending the
statute in 1984 to provide:
Nothing in this chapter is intended to limit the authority of agencies to agree to
the disposition of rights in inventions made in the performance of work under
funding agreements with persons other than nonprofit organizations or small
business firms in accordance with the Statement of Government Patent Policy
issued on February 18, 1983, agency regulations, or other applicable
regulations or to otherwise limit the authority of agencies to allow such persons
to retain ownership of inventions except that all funding agreements, including
those with other than small business firms and nonprofit organizations, shall
include the requirements established in [section] 202(c)(4) [giving the Federal
agency a paid-up, nonexclusive license to the invention] and section 203 [giving
the agency march-in rights in certain circumstances, including if the contractor
fails to take adequate steps to achieve practical utilization of the invention] of
this title..[sic] (double period in original).
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, § 501(13), 35 U.S.C. § 210(c) (1994).
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laborations with industry since passage of the Bayh-Dole Act
four years earlier,' 69 and contrasted this success with the rela-
tively poor performance of the federal laboratories.'
C. Government as Licensor
At the same time that the government was presented as an in-
competent licensor, legislative efforts were underway to expand
the role of the government as a licensor of its own patents. The
Bayh-Dole Act itself, while limiting the circumstances in which
the federal government would hold title to patents, authorized
federal agencies to apply for and hold patents and to license
these patents on a nonexclusive, exclusive, or partially exclusive
basis, royalty-free or in exchange for royalties. "'
Separately, in hearings on the role of federal laboratories in
technology transfer,' witnesses from federal agencies described
institutional barriers to achieving effective technology transfer
to the private sector, including the absence of a clear legislative
mandate or authorization for federal laboratories to engage in
technology transfer, "3 insufficient funding for technology trans-
fer activities," and a lack of professional recognition and re-
wards to individuals who devoted time and energy to technology
transfer. 7'
Congress attempted to address these problems in the Steven-
son-Wydler Act, passed the same year as the Bayh-Dole Act,
which explicitly directed federal agencies to "strive where ap-
propriate to transfer federally owned or originated technology
16 S. Rep. No. 98-662, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5799, 5800.
110 S. Rep. No. 98-662, at 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5799, 5803-5804.
"7 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 207, 94 Stat. 3015, 3023-3024 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1994)).
See The Role of Federal Laboratories, supra note 125.
'Id. at 36 (statement of George F. Linsteadt, Chairman, Federal Laboratory
Consortium, Naval Weapons Center).
1
74 Id. at 570-71 (statement of Richard C. Atkinson, Director, National Science
Foundation) (noting that laboratory directors who allocate funds to goals outside of
their primary missions are vulnerable to budget reduction).
115 Id. at 51 (testimony of Gerald E. Miller, Science Technology Coordinator,
Federal Laboratory Consortium) ("I was told by my laboratory when I opted to do
this for the lab that I would never be promoted again if I chose to do this. If I was
willing to sacrifice my career, then go to it and be technology transfer [sic].").
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to State and local governments and to the private sector" and to
set aside funds from their research and development budgets to
support technology transfer functions."6 In contrast to the
thrust of Bayh-Dole, which was to get the federal government
out of the technology transfer loop, the thrust of Stevenson-
Wydler was to engage federal agencies actively in the process of
technology transfer in cases where there was no contractor to
take charge of this mission itself.
Efforts to promote active federal involvement in technology
transfer took a major step forward with passage of the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986.'" That Act amended the Ste-
venson-Wydler Act to authorize government-operated labora-
tories to enter into cooperative research and development
agreements ("CRADAs") with industry, and to agree in ad-
vance, subject to reservation of a royalty-free license, to assign
patents on inventions made by federal employees to the col-
laborating firm and to waive any federal claims to inventions
made by the collaborating firm or its employees. 8 It also pro-
176 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, § 11,
94 Stat. 2311, 2318 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710(a),(b) (1994)). That
Act also created Offices of Research and Technology Applications in the larger
laboratories to evaluate new technologies and promote transfer of technologies with
commercial potential, § 11(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710(b) (1994)),
and created a Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology in the Department of
Commerce to function as a clearinghouse for information on federal inventions and
patents, § 11(d) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710(d) (1994)).
- Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986).
118 Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 2, 100 Stat. 1785-
1787 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3) (1994)). That Act
also established the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer to
promote technology transfer activities within the federal laboratories. Id. § 3, 100
Stat. 1787-1789 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. § 3710(e) (1994)); see also
Technology Competitiveness Act, Subtitle B of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5101-5184, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(102 Stat.) 1107, 1426-1454 (renaming and upgrading National Bureau of Standards
as National Institute of Standards and Technology with mission to enhance
competitiveness of American industry and creating Advanced Technology Program
to assist businesses in creating and applying generic technology and research results);
National Technical Information Act of 1988, Subtitle B of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
519, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2589, 2594-2596 (amending the Stevenson-Wydler
Act to permit National Technical Information Service to take actions to disseminate
technical information to private sector); National Competitiveness Technology
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vided for the sharing of royalties with federal employee-
inventors"' and directed agencies that do not elect to file patent
applications or otherwise to promote commercialization of in-
ventions they own to allow government employee-inventors to
retain title."8 Three years later Congress moved to promote ac-
tive technology transfer from the national laboratories with pas-
sage of the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act
of 1989,' which amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to include
government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories." Presi-
dent Clinton recently signed into law the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 ,"n further expanding the
rights of private sector CRADA partners to obtain exclusive li-
censes, providing for the sharing of federal royalty income with
Transfer Act of 1989, Part C of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, §§ 3131-3133, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103
Stat.) 1352, 1674-1679 (amending Stevenson-Wydler Act to include government-
owned, contractor-operated laboratories; to provide that operating contracts for such
laboratories may establish technology transfer and dissemination of information on
technology transfer as laboratory missions; and to revoke federal agencies' authority
to waive technology transfer funding requirements); National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 827-828, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 1485, 1606-1607 (allowing federal agencies to use partnership intermediaries to
conduct collaborative research and establishing model program to study commercial
use of collaborative research); American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-245, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 7 (providing for transfer of scientific
and technical information to National Technical Information Service, appropriating
funds for Regional Centers for Transfer of Manufacturing Technology); National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 3135(b), 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 2315, 2641 (requiring Secretary of Energy to establish
program to facilitate and encourage transfer of technology to small businesses).
IFederal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 7, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1785, 1792-1794 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710c (1994)).
- Id. § 8, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1794-1795 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710d
(1994)). President Reagan promptly followed with an executive order directing the
heads of executive departments and agencies to "promote the
commercialization ... of patentable results of federally funded research by granting
to all contractors, regardless of size, the title to patents made in whole or in part with
Federal funds...." Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (1987), as amended
by Exec. Order No. 12,618, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,661 (1987), reprinted as amended in 15
U.S.C.A. § 3710 app. at 312 (West 1996).
- National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989, Part C of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
189, §§ 3131-3133, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1352, 1674-1679.
I Id. § 3133(a)(2)(A), 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1675.
11 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
113, §§ 4-6, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 775.
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laboratory scientists, and clarifying the rights of federal employ-
ees to own inventions that the agency chooses not to pate t m
Through these and other measures, Congress has gradually
expanded the private appropriation policy that the Bayh-Dole
Act endorsed for research in nonprofit organizations and small
businesses to cover government-sponsored research in a wide
range of settings, including intramural research in government
laboratories and collaborative research between government
and private laboratories. Thus while on the extramural side of
federally-sponsored research Congress has urged the sponsoring
agencies to forbear from asserting patent rights in favor of con-
tractors who might develop the underlying technologies more
effectively, on the intramural side Congress has urged the same
agencies to become more active in patenting their own discov-
eries and licensing them to industry.
Since its passage in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act has been consis-
tently hailed as an unqualified success in stimulating the com-
mercial development of discoveries emerging from government-
sponsored research in universities.85 Its promoters have cited
the dramatic increase in numbers of patents obtained by univer-
sities," the superior record of universities, as compared to the
'& Id. §§ 4-6, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 775-779.
'18 See, e.g., The Bayh-Dole Act, A Review of Patent Issues in Federally Funded
Research: Hearings on Pub. L. No. 96-517 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1-2
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Bayh-Dole Oversight Hearings] (opening statement of Sen.
Dennis DeConcini); id. at 11 (statement of Birch Bayh, Bayh, Connaughton,
Fensterheim & Malone); id. at 19-20 (statement of Daryl Chamblee, Acting Deputy
Director for Science, Policy, and Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health);
id. at 31-33 (statement of Howard Bremer, Association of University Technology
Managers); id. at 89-90 (statement of Barbara Conta, Director, Technology Transfer,
Regeneron Pharmaceutical Corp.); id. at 100-01 (statement of Charles Vest,
President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); id. at at 104-05 (statement of Gary
Munsinger, President, Research Corporation Technology).
'8+ From 1980 to 1991, U.S. patents awarded to the 100 academic institutions with
the greatest R&D volume increased by a factor of 3.8 from 290 to 1,112. National
Science Board, 1993 Science & Engineering Indicators 430 app. tbl. 5-27. During the
same time period, expenditures for R&D performed in universities and colleges, as
expressed in constant 1987 dollars, increased only by a factor of 1.75, from $8.608
billion to $15.086 billion, with the federal government's share of the expenditures




federal government, in licensing their patents, and the explosion
in collaborative research between universities and industry as
evidence that the Bayh-Dole Act works in practice. Subsequent
legislation has attempted to duplicate this success for govern-
ment-sponsored research in other settings, including intramural
research, thereby expanding the government's role as patent li-
censor.
III. THE EVOLVING LOGIC OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY
This review of government patent policy over the past fifteen
years reveals a consistent, dual-pronged strategy for promoting
technology transfer. One prong aims to fortify the incentives of
firms to develop commercial products out of the results of gov-
ernment-sponsored research by clearing away bureaucratic ob-
stacles that impede or render uncertain their access to patent
rights or exclusive licenses. The other prong aims to create in-
centives for individual and institutional research performers that
are not in the business of developing products to cooperate in
the commercialization of their inventions by allowing them to
own patents and to share in the resulting profits and by directing
them to consider technology transfer a part of their mission. To
some extent these two prongs converge, uniting research per-
formers and innovating firms in a common goal of identifying
discoveries of commercial interest and working together to de-
velop them into products. Yet there is an inherent tension be-
tween the revenue motive of research performers, as patent
owners and licensors, and the profit incentives of innovating
firms as licensees.
Consider the respective interests of a university that owns a
patent on a discovery and a firm that is interested in developing
that discovery into a commercial product. From the perspective
of the firm, the way the university-owned patent makes product
development more attractive is by providing the means of ex-
cluding competitors from the market for the product. Any roy-
alty obligation that the firm incurs under the patent does noth-
ing to enhance the profitability of the product but is merely a
tax on product development that increases costs and reduces
profits. It is by charging monopoly prices without facing compe-
tition, and not by paying royalties, that the firm preserves for it-
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self the rents from product development.
From the point of view of the university, on the other hand,
patent royalties are a concrete measure of the success of their
technology transfer efforts, as well as a revenue source. Some
of the most commonly acclaimed success stories for university
technology transfer involve patents that yield substantial royalty
payments through nonexclusive licenses, although nonexclusive
licenses do little or nothing to give licensees an advantage over
their competitors and thus are unlikely to enhance the profit-
ability of product development.1" An outstanding example is
the Cohen-Boyer patents on fundamental recombinant DNA
techniques jointly owned by Stanford University and the Uni-
versity of California. The Cohen-Boyer patents have been
widely licensed to biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms
on terms that have been set low enough that they have gener-
ated few complaints from industry and have probably not cre-
ated a significant impediment to commercial development."
Because of the sheer number of firms using the technology, they
have brought significant revenues to their institutions,"89 yet it
can hardly be argued that the patents have done anything to
promote product development that would not have occurred if
the patented technology had instead been placed in the public
domain. The reason universities count these patents as suc-
cesses is not that they have helped move the technology out to
the private sector for commercial development, but rather that
they have generated a lot of revenue for the institutions that
own them.
Even when university-owned patents are licensed on an ex-
clusive basis, universities covet the rents that their licensees
stand to collect from product development, and they have every
117 Nonexclusive patent licenses may give licensees an advantage over at least some
of their competitors if the number of licensees is restricted, or if some licensees enjoy
preferential license terms.
- Interview with Katherine Ku, Office of Technology Licensing, Stanford
University, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 22, 1994).
-See Floyd Grolle, Stanford University Office of Technology Licensing, Remarks
at the National Research Council Workshop on Intellectual Property and Research
Tools in Molecular Biology, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15-16, 1996) (estimating the
total income from the Cohen-Boyer patents to Stanford and the University of
California as approximately $200 million over the lifetime of the patents).
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incentive under the Bayh-Dole Act to try to negotiate license
terms that will give them as big a share of the profits as they can
get. Nothing other than forbearance on the part of universities,
and resistance on the part of potential licensees, prevents uni-
versities from striking deals that would extract the full amount
of rents from development of a patented product for the univer-
sities themselves, which would leave the innovating firms in ex-
actly the same position they would be in if the discovery had
been placed in the public domain.
A striking recent example that suggests this potential is the
exclusive license granted by Rockefeller University to Amgen,
Inc., on an obesity gene found in mice. The discovery was li-
censed a few months after it was published, and prior to the is-
suance of any patent, in exchange for a "$20 million signing bo-
nus, includ[ing] milestone payments totaling 'several times that
amount,' and unspecified future royalties" on product sales."9 It
remains to be seen whether any patent rights that Rockefeller
ultimately obtains will protect Amgen from competition in the
sale of any viable commercial product. A sophisticated firm was
willing to take a license on these terms, and perhaps they will
yet profit from the deal, but the university's appetite for the po-
tential rents at stake can only diminish that prospect. In this
sense the revenue motive of licensors is in tension with the
Bayh-Dole Act's underlying goal of enhancing the incentives of
licensees to develop new products.
If the only goal of university patenting were to make com-
mercial development of university-based discoveries more at-
tractive, and if universities were infinitely good sports with un-
limited resources to devote to patenting and nary a concern for
their own pecuniary interests, the technology transfer goal
would be better served through nonroyalty-bearing exclusive li-
censes. Revenues to universities, however beneficial they may
be to the overall research enterprise, do nothing in and of them-
selves to promote technology transfer and commercial devel-
opment of products based on university research results.
'1' See Richard Stone, Rockefeller Strikes Fat Deal With Amgen, 268 Science 631,
631 (1995); Rockefeller University Awards Amgen Exclusive License to Develop




Of course, universities would have no reason to cooperate in
technology transfer on a royalty-free basis, and the Bayh-Dole
Act did not ask them to make such a sacrifice. A revenue mo-
tive may have been necessary to gain the participation of uni-
versities in technology transfer, but that revenue motive inevi-
tably operates at cross-purposes with the larger goal of
promoting product development by enhancing its profitability.
By encouraging the patenting (and licensing in exchange for
royalties) of discoveries that in a previous era might have been
freely disseminated, the Bayh-Dole Act in effect redistributes
some of the gains from innovation back upstream, charging the
firms that develop commercial products and paying the universi-
ties and government agencies that made early discoveries re-
lated to the product. Whatever might be said of this redistribu-
tion from the standpoint of fairness, it would appear more likely
to retard product development than to promote it. 9'
From another perspective, this redistribution may not be such
a bad thing. It may be that universities spend their money in
more socially valuable ways than their patent licensees (or the
shareholders or customers of their licensees). It may make
sense to return some of the benefits realized in the private sec-
tor from the development of new technologies back to the re-
search enterprise that spawned them in order to create more
new technologies in the future. At a time when public funding
for research is increasingly hard to come by, perhaps patent
royalties can become an important supplement to government
contracts and grants in covering the costs of research.
There are reasons to be cautious about this line of reasoning,
however. First, although it is difficult to obtain good data on
costs associated with university technology transfer activities, it
appears that at least so far most universities are not making
money from their patent portfolios.'" Justifications of university
"'The revenue motive of universities might promote product development to the
extent that it prompts universities and government agencies to be more aggressive
about marketing their discoveries, which leads more of the discoveries to be
commercially developed. But when the commercial potential of a discovery is
manifest to industry, and the terms of a Bayh-Dole license do nothing to enhance the
profit expectations of industry, the license may appear to industry as a tax that
redistributes rents upstream to the public sector.
92 There are few sources of data on net revenues from university licensing activities.
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and public sector patenting as a source of revenue must there-
fore confront the sobering fact that these revenues are in most
cases insufficient even to cover the costs of patenting and li-
censing activities. But some universities are already profiting
from their patent portfolios,"93 and perhaps others will start
making money as they become more sophisticated about identi-
fying discoveries that are of sufficient commercial interest to jus-
tify the costs of pursuing patent rights and marketing these dis-
coveries to the private sector. Nonetheless, data from the
Association of University Technology Managers indicate that so
far even the gross royalties collected by its members under pat-
ents are trivial in comparison to their total sponsored research
The Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") gathers annual data
from its members on gross royalties received, royalties paid to other institutions, legal
fees expended, legal fees reimbursed, and numbers of professional and staff support
full-time equivalents employed, but it does not collect data on the costs of operating
technology transfer offices. See Association of University Technology Managers,
Inc., AUTM Licensing Survey: FY 1994 Survey Summary and Selected Data FY
1991-FY 1994 (on file with The Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter
AUTM Survey]. For FY 1994, AUTM United States university members reported
collecting $265,932,578 in gross royalties received, paying $20,747,204 in royalties to
other institutions, and expending $53,345,200 in legal fees, of which $25,600,573 were
reimbursed. Id. at 28 attachment F. Subtracting royalties paid from royalties
collected, and further subtracting unreimbursed legal fees, yields a net royalty figure
of approximately $217 million, before subtracting internal operating costs. No data
are provided on these internal costs, but AUTM reports that the U.S. university
respondents employed 595.67 full-time professional equivalents and 440A1 staff
support full-time equivalents. Id. at 19 attachment D. Dividing the net royalty figure
calculated above by an aggregate staff of 1036 full-time equivalents (over half of
which are professionals) yields net revenues of approximately $209,459.50 per staff
member nationwide, before subtracting such costs as salaries, benefits, office space,
and the like. This rough calculation suggests that it is unlikely that in the aggregate
the system is yet doing much more than covering its costs. And given that revenues
are heavily concentrated in the top ten (perhaps fifteen) institutions, see infra note
193, it is likely that most universities are at present losing money on their technology
transfer operations.
-,3 AUTM data indicate that in FY 1994 the top ten institutions in terms of royalties
received accounted for 65% of the gross royalties received by the 159 institutions
responding to the AUTM survey (in order of gross royalties received the top ten
institutions are: Research Corporation Technologies (a patent management firm);
University of California System; Stanford University; Sloan Kettering Institute for
Cancer Research (a U.S. hospital and research institute); Columbia University; City
of Hope National Medical Center (a U.S. hospital and research institute); Michigan
State University; University of Washington; Iowa State University; and Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation). Id. at 20-26 attachment E.
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expenditures,9 ' suggesting that these royalties are unlikely to
become a significant source of research funding for universities
overall in the near future. For the most part, Bayh-Dole royal-
ties do well to pay for the costs of running the system, and the
value of the system must be measured in other terms.
Second, even if university patent portfolios could become
a significant source of revenue for universities, one might ask
whether it is preferable to finance the operations of universities
through patent royalties or through tax dollars. Royalties under
Bayh-Dole patents may be thought of as a form of tax that is
collected in a decentralized fashion by institutions performing
government-sponsored research and imposed on specific users
of the patented technologies rather than on the general tax-
paying public. On the payment side, such Bayh-Dole "taxes"
have the virtue of being a completely voluntary levy; no one
who thinks the technology isn't worth it needs to pay. On the
collection side, they have the virtue of bypassing the political
process of obtaining legislative appropriations for research and
the peer review process of establishing the relative worth of a
particular project. But are these indeed virtues? Although in
recent years it has become increasingly common to view these
selection mechanisms as bureaucratic impediments to the con-
duct of worthwhile research, the purpose of these impediments
is to identify worthwhile research, and to determine the extent
to which research expenditures are justified relative to spending
on competing social goals. That institutions performing re-
search should welcome a revenue source that allows them to
sidestep these selection mechanisms is unsurprising, but it is not
clear that this decentralized Bayh-Dole "tax" system will give
taxpayers and consumers the greatest value for their payments.
Finally, one might worry about whether the revenue incen-
tives created for research performers by the Bayh-Dole Act are
a good thing. Is the lure of patent royalties leading universities
and investigators to select research projects that appear likely to
yield patent rights? If so, is this quest distracting them from re-
"I AUTM figures for FY 1994 indicate a total figure of $421,809,878 in gross
royalties received by all respondents, which is approximately two percent of the
$18,213,718,418 spent by respondents on sponsored research. Id. at 32 attachment F.
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search that is more valuable from a broader social perspective?
Perhaps we can rely on industry to perform research that is
likely to yield patentable results, and the talents and resources
of universities might better be directed toward research of a
more fundamental, less readily appropriable character, the
benefits of which are more speculative. There is a fine line be-
tween using patents to motivate universities to cooperate in
transferring research discoveries to the private sector for com-
mercial development and using patents to motivate universities
to perform research of a character that is likely to yield poten-
tial commercial products. The former motivation may change
how universities disseminate the results of their research; the
latter may change the character of the research itself.
IV. THE DIVERGING INTERESTS OF UNIVERSITIES AND
INNOVATING FIRMS
The competing interests of universities and innovating firms
under the Bayh-Dole Act erupted into open conflict in a recent
controversy over patent rights in the Advanced Technology
Program ("ATP") managed by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology ("NIST") within the Department of
Commerce. That controversy highlights inherent tensions in the
current technology transfer scheme.
ATP was established in 1988 to provide assistance to business
in joint research and development ventures (which might in-
clude universities and independent research organizations)
aimed at creating and applying precompetitive, generic tech-
nologies to commercialize significant new scientific discoveries
and to refine manufacturing technologies.'95 Although ATP was
created to foster collaborative research among government,
universities and businesses, from the outset the ATP intellectual
property provisions highlighted conflicts of interest among these
research performers.
As originally enacted, these provisions gave the federal gov-
'95ATP was created by the passage of Subpart C of the Technology
Competitiveness Act, Subtitle B of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5131, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107, 1439-1444
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 278n (1994)).
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ernment recoupment of a share of the licensing fees and royalty
payments made to any business or joint venture receiving ATP
funding in proportion to the federal share of costs incurred in
making the discovery. '96 Previous Congresses had repeatedly
rejected such recoupment provisions in passing technology
transfer legislation, including the Bayh-Dole Act, and the ATP
recoupment provision was ultimately repealed in the American
Technology Preeminence Act of 1991."9  The accompanying
Senate Report noted that "the concept of recoupment presents
serious administrative problems and is a significant deterrent to
the participation of private companies in the ATP.""9 8 These dif-
ficulties with recoupment had been repeatedly and persuasively
presented to prior Congresses in hearings on technology trans-
fer legislation.' That a federal recoupment provision was in-
- Id. § 5131, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1441.
'-7American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-245,
§ 201(c)(6)(A), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 7, 17.
198 S. Rep. No. 102-157, at 15-16 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 19, 34.
'9 See, e.g., 1979 House Patent Policy Oversight Hearings, supra note 62, at 11
(statement of Sen. Harrison H. Schmitt) (maintaining that mandatory government
royalty unnecessarily duplicates federal income tax); id. at 26 (statement of James E.
Denny, Assistant General Counsel for Patents, Department of Energy) (asserting
that recoupment should take place only on selective basis); id. at 29 (statement of
Donald R. Dunner, President, American Patent Law Association) (emphasizing the
difficulty of assigning value to particular inventions for recoupment purposes);
Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 100 (testimony of Patrick J. lannotta,
President, Ecolotrol, Inc.) (noting possibility of disparate treatment of small and
large companies under a recoupment scheme); id. at 150 (statement of Betsy Ancker-
Johnson, Vice President of General Motors for the Environmental Activities Staff)
(expressing concern about administrative costs of recoupment); id. at 160 (statement
of Hyman G. Rickover, Director of the Division of Naval Reactors, Department of
Energy) (outlining government administrative costs of recoupment); id. at 212
(statement of Niels Reimers, Manager of Technology Licensing, Stanford University)
(contending that taxes on profits provide sufficient revenue to make recoupment
unnecessary); id. at 215-16 (statement of Julius Jancin, Jr., Vice President, American
Patent Law Association) (same); House Hearings on President's Industrial
Innovation Program, supra note 3, at 160 (statement of Donald R. Dunner, President,
American Patent Law Association) (asserting that government receives full return on
investment when hardware is delivered); id. at 463-64 (testimony of Paul Gomory,
Counsel to Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation)
(maintaining that recoupment is a disincentive to contract); cf. 1979 House Patent
Policy Hearings, supra note 62, at 50-51 (statement of Gardner Stacy, President,
American Chemical Society) (indicating that American Chemical Society supports
recoupment through royalty); Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 108, at 223
(testimony of Eric P. Schellin, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, National Small
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cluded in the 1988 legislation, and remained on the books for
three years, testifies to the continuing equitable appeal of al-
lowing the government to share in the profits made on tech-
nologies developed in part at public expense.
At the same time that Congress repealed the recoupment
provision, it also amended the statute to provide that title to any
intellectual property arising from ATP assistance "shall vest in a
company or companies incorporated in the United States."'
The exclusion of foreign companies was unsurprising in light of
the consistent jingoistic, international-competitiveness rationale
underlying technology transfer policy since the Bayh-Dole Act.
But the focus on "companies" appeared to represent a depar-
ture from the favored position occupied by universities and
other nonprofit institutions under Bayh-Dole. Over the strenu-
ous objections of these nonprofit research institutions,' NIST
construed this language to "prevent universities and other non-
profit organizations from obtaining title to inventions arising
under the ATP."'
Former Senator Birch Bayh, one of the original sponsors of
the Bayh-Dole Act, echoed the outrage of universities in testi-
mony at oversight hearings on the Bayh-Dole Act held shortly
after NIST announced its interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage:
[U]nder the Bayh-Dole Act the universities have demonstrated
that they can be tremendously creative in developing new tech-
nology and working with private industry to commercialize it.
They should not be discouraged from continuing to play that
Business Association) (indicating that small business would insist upon recoupment
because it "is used to paying its own way").
SAmerican Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-245,
§ 201(c)(6)(C), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 7, 17 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 278n(d)(11) (1994) (quoted language in original)).
10,In announcing amendments to its implementing regulations for the ATP
program in January of 1994, NIST noted that it had received 40 comments on its
proposed regulation on patent rights, including 39 from universities and other
nonprofit organizations opposed to the proposal, and one from a business supporting
the proposal. Advanced Technology Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 663, 664 (1994) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 295.8(a)). Nonetheless, NIST felt bound by the terms of the
statute to exclude universities and nonprofit entities from patent ownership. Id. at
665.
202 Id. at 664.
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role in industry-led joint ventures as they would be if the poli-
cies at the Advanced Technology Program... continue to ex-
clude them from holding title to intellectual property.2 3
Although nominally calling for Congress to stick by the origi-
nal intent of the Bayh-Dole Act, this plea reveals a subtle but
significant shift in the justification for granting patent rights to
universities. At the time of the Bayh-Dole Act, leaving patent
title in universities was primarily justified as providing an incen-
tive for businesses to take an interest in developing discoveries
that universities were making, and presumably would continue
to make, with or without patent rights. Fourteen years later, the
emphasis is on providing an incentive to universities to be
"creative in developing new technology and working with pri-
vate industry to commercialize it." If the incentives of industry
remained paramount, it is by no means obvious that the alloca-
tion of intellectual property rights in ATP discoveries to busi-
nesses rather than to their nonprofit collaborators would violate
the spirit of the Bayh-Dole Act. Given a private research part-
ner in hand with an interest in developing the discovery, vesting
title initially in the university rather than in the private firm
would seem at first glance only to burden commercial develop-
ment of the discovery with the need to obtain a license'and
make royalty payments to the university. That universities
should challenge the ATP patent provisions as conflicting with
the Bayh-Dole Act thus begs the question whether the primary
purpose of that Act was to benefit universities or to enhance the
commercial attractiveness of research discoveries to innovating
firms.
An important goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was to eliminate the
middlemen in technology transfer rather than to instate univer-
sities as technology brokers with the power to regulate and
"tax" technology transfers to firms. Consider the following ex-
change, prior to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, between Chair-
man Robert W. Kastenmeier ("K") of the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, and Howard W. Bremer
- 1994 Bayh-Dole Oversight Hearings, supra note 185, at 14 (statement of Birch
Bayh, Bayh, Connaughton, Fensterheim & Malone).
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("B"), patent counsel for the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation and representative of the American Council on
Education, the Council on Government Relations of the Na-
tional Association of College and University Business Officers,
and the Association of American Universities:
K: S.414, by preferring universities and nonprofit institutions,
small business, tends to make them the middlemen in terms of
the transfer of technology?
B: Yes.
K: If that is the case, and really, yours is a very strong presen-
tation for getting technology in the hands of those who will ul-
timately develop it, I would think that you would be led by that
belief to prefer a bill which at least would enable that transfer
directly to industry, the private sector, even among the largest
and most efficient, in terms of their application. Yet, you ap-
parently do not?
B: In other words, you mean the exclusive licensing arrange-
ment with the Government, directly to contractor, regardless of
size?
K: Yes; in other words, a much more liberalized or beneficial
policy with respect to transfer by title or by licensing or by
whatever means, with the Federal Government directly, to
large or small?
B: ... Philosophically we certainly agree with that proposition.
But, as I have said, as a practical matter, and from the political
climate we have seen over the past 3 years in working primarily
on the Senate side with S. 414, we frankly don't think legisla-
tion which purports to transfer substantial patent right [sic] to
all contractors is going to fly. And if such legislation does not
fly, how many more years have we lost in establishing an effec-
tive innovation policy?
That is why we strongly advocate a piecemeal approach to the
situation; passage of H.R. 2414 [the Carter administration's
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proposed bill] initially; gain the experience with that bill, to
show its salutary effects upon the [technology] transfer; and
then expansion of that bill to embrace other government con-
tractors.m
It is not entirely clear that Bremer and Kastenmeier are on
the same wavelength in this colloquy; Kastenmeier's questions
appear to be directed at eliminating universities as middlemen
in technology transfer, while Bremer's responses appear to en-
dorse a policy of leaving title with all government contractors,
presumably including universities as well as businesses. None-
theless, Bremer seems to concede, at least "philosophically,"
that technology transfer would be more readily achieved if title
to patents could vest initially in private firms rather than in uni-
versity or nonprofit "middlemen," although such a straightfor-
ward approach would not "fly" politically in 1980. Better to get
there on a "piecemeal" basis, beginning with title in universities,
and subsequently giving title to private firms.
If, as of 1980, title in universities was not an end in itself, but
rather a first step toward getting private firms the exclusive
rights that they needed to encourage commercial development
of research discoveries, one might expect that vesting title ini-
tially in private contractors to discoveries arising in the course of
collaborative research involving both universities and the pri-
vate sector would be a logical next step for Congress to take a
decade later. Viewed from this perspective, a rule that com-
pelled private contractors to look to their university collabora-
tors for licenses under university-owned patents, rather than
granting them full title, might seem like a throwback to the pre-
Bayh-Dole era, when private firms were not allowed to own
patents in the results of government-sponsored research, and
hardly like a fulfillment of the spirit of Bayh-Dole.
Universities further claimed that denying them intellectual
property rights would diminish their incentives to participate in
ATP research. But this argument also represents a significant
and troubling departure from the original justification for leav-
ing title to patents with universities under the Bayh-Dole Act.




In 1980, universities also invoked an incentive-based argument
in favor of retaining patent rights, but in a somewhat less venal
form. Rather than claiming that they would lose interest in per-
forming federally-sponsored research unless they stood to profit
from the resulting patents, they claimed that they would lose in-
terest in pursuing patents unless they could retain ownership
themselves. They presented themselves and their researchers as
primarily interested in doing basic research and publishing their
research results rather than in obtaining patents. It was the
commercial firms that might develop university-based discover-
ies into marketable products that insisted on patent rights, not
the universities themselves. But without patent ownership, uni-
versities would have no incentive to urge their researchers to
take time away from their academic work to make invention
disclosures, file patent applications, and cooperate in finding
and educating commercial licensees who would take their dis-
coveries out of the laboratory and into the stream of commerce.
Consider the following statement of Thomas F. Jones, Vice
President for Research at MIT, also representing the Associa-
tion of American Universities, the National Association of Col-
lege and University Business Officers, the American Associa-
tion of State Colleges and Universities, and the American
Council on Education, in Senate hearings in 1978:
The university, by its very nature, is oriented to basic and
fundamental research as an integral part of its. education proc-
ess. The university is not and should not be a business or
commercial enterprise. It does not develop products nor sell
goods. Inventions made in the performance of Government-
sponsored research are usually incidental to that research; that
is, byproducts rather than specified objectives....
To translate technologically useful concepts created at the
university into commercially viable developments from which
the public can directly benefit requires a considerable amount
of additional development, testing, and marketing.
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... To encourage industry to spend this time, effort, and
money, it is often essential to offer prospective licensees sound
patent protection, coupled with reasonable license terms....
.. It is feared that title in the Government would have a de-
pressing effect on the amount and quality of invention disclo-
sures from inventors since there would tend to be fewer incen-
tives for the considerable additional effort needed over and
above merely a legal compliance with the provisions of the re-
search contract.
For example, my staff works at encouraging the filing of dis-
closures. University scientists, by the nature of their personal
dedications, do not think in terms of patents and commerciali-
zation until we stimulate them to do so.2 5
If fifteen years ago the point of granting universities patent
rights was merely to motivate institutions and individuals who
would otherwise have been indifferent to commercial considera-
tions to go with the technology transfer program and provide a
source of exclusive rights for industry, one might expect that
universities would happily yield patent rights to their commer-
cial research partners on ATP projects. In this way they could
rid themselves of the worldly distraction of filing patent applica-
tions and seeking commercial licensees. Their present indigna-
tion at the ATP patent regulations calls for some explanation.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the Bayh-Dole Act
gave universities a revenue motive to pursue patent rights, and
this revenue motive has taken on a life of its own, unmoored
from its original justification of inducing indifferent academi-
cians to obtain patent rights in order to safeguard the commer-
cial incentives of industry. Property rights that are initially
granted for particular instrumental purposes eventually come to
be seen as entitlements of the grantee, creating expectations
that are difficult to extinguish. Although only a few universities
205 1978 Senate Select Committee Hearings, supra note 62, at 306-07, 309 (statement




are actually profiting from their patent portfolios so far, many of
them have great expectations, and they feel fully justified in us-
ing their patent rights to bring in as much revenue as they can.
As funding for university-based research has become harder to
obtain, universities may have grown reluctant to give up even
the trivial revenues that they hope to earn from their patent
portfolios. Moreover, university-owned patents may help to at-
tract further research funding from firms with an interest in the
patented technology in amounts that are far more significant
than anticipated patent royalties on developed products.'
When universities sought patent rights in the pre-Bayh-Dole
era, their claims stood out against a prevailing culture that pro-
moted placing the results of government-sponsored research in
general, and university-based research in particular, in the pub-
lic domain.' Today, that culture has changed. The current pre-
sumption is that research performers who use government funds
are entitled to pursue patent rights in their discoveries if they
want them. When universities claim that they should own pat-
ent rights in ATP discoveries, the alternative is not dedication to
the public, but outright ownership by their private-sector col-
laborators. A denial of patent rights to universities that partici-
pate in making patentable inventions with ATP funding may
thus seem like an inappropriate allocation of research rewards
to commercial firms at the expense of universities rather than a
return to the public on its investment in research.
There is another argument, to which I alluded earlier, for pre-
ferring universities to their private-sector collaborators as pat-
ent holders. By the nature of their institutional mission and cul-
ture, universities may have a preference for widespread dissem-
ination of new knowledge, while private firms might be more in-
clined to husband new knowledge as an exclusive resource. This
difference in basic inclinations may be reinforced by differences
206 have found no data on the extent to which university-owned patents have
attracted industry funding of university-based research, as distinguished from royalty
income, but the importance of university patents in attracting such funding has been
confirmed to me in conversations with technology transfer professionals. E.g.,
Interview with Lita Nelsen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Cambridge,
Mass. (Oct. 27, 1994); Interview with Katherine Ku, supra note 188.
207 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177, 181-84 (1987).
1996] 1723
1724 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 82:1663
in the financial incentives of universities on one hand and pri-
vate firms on the other. Private firms that develop new tech-
nologies in fields where they have already made substantial in-
vestments and hold valuable commercial positions might
sometimes find it advantageous to suppress the new technolo-
gies rather than to license them to their competitors. Universi-
ties, by contrast, have nothing to gain by suppressing new tech-
nologies, and in fact stand to lose royalties by suppressing
inventions that could be widely marketed. I noted previously
that when universities exploit their patents by offering nonex-
clusive licenses on a widespread basis the patents are not en-
hancing the profitability of product development. Nonetheless,
there may be circumstances, particularly involving fundamental
technologies with many potential applications in different firms
and even in multiple industries, where widespread, nonexclusive
licensing enhances the social value of the technology more than
exclusive licensing, and universities may be more likely in such
circumstances than private patent owners to license the technol-
ogy nonexclusively. University-owned patents may thus provide
a pseudo-public domain of technology that is not freely avail-
able, but is widely available to anyone who ig willing to pay for
it. This may be preferable to private ownership.
This argument for university ownership should seem particu-
larly powerful in light of the stated objectives of ATP. The pur-
pose of ATP, according to the Senate Report accompanying the
American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, is to provide
federal research dollars to assist industry in developing precom-
petitive, generic technologies of use to a wide range of firms:
Generic technologies are those that promise to benefit a wide
range of industries and government agencies. Precompetitive
R&D lies between laboratory discoveries and inventions, on
the one hand, and proprietary product development, on the
other. Technical work at this stage focuses on overcoming ba-
sic engineering obstacles and barriers which threaten to slow
the commercialization and production of new technologies.
This type of research can be long-term and risky, yet many in-
dustries and companies may benefit from the results. For this
Government-Sponsored Research
reason, Federal support is appropriate and necessary.2
In other words, the reason to provide federal funds for ATP is
that the proposed research is expected to yield results that will
be of greatest value if they are widely used by many firms rather
than exclusively appropriated by a single firm. If the aim of
ATP funding is to generate research results that will be widely
disseminated, university patent ownership may be more likely to
bring that result about than patent ownership by private firms.
But if exclusive appropriation of ATP research results is not
in the public interest, it is not clear why those results should be
patented at all, whether by a private firm or by a university,
rather than made freely available to all firms in the public do-
main.
On the other hand, if exclusive, private appropriation is ex-
pected and desirable, it is not clear why the government is pay-
ing for the research. ATP funding, with its explicit focus on the
development of applied technology through collaborations with
industry, has proven particularly vulnerable to challenge along
these lines. Indeed, although ATP has been a cornerstone of
the Clinton administration's technology policy, it has come
under attack from the Republican Congress as an example of
"corporate welfare" and meddlesome "industrial policy" on the
part of government."' The attack on ATP in Congress has not
focused on who should own the resulting patents, but rather on
whether the government should be funding the research. None-
theless, the controversy over ATP highlights the relationship be-
tween the justification for public funding of research and the
private appropriation of research results.
When research results are unlikely to be privately appropri-
ated, the anticipated private benefits may appear inadequate to
justify the investment of private funds, even though the social
benefits may be significant. In such a situation public funding is
- S. Rep. No. 102-157, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 19,21.
See, e.g., Testimony of M.R.C. Greenwood, Associate Director for Science,
Office of Science and Technology Policy, before the Joint Economic Committee,
103d Cong. (June 24, 1994), available in LEXIS, Legis. Library, CNGTST File.
210 See, e.g., Testimony of Hon. Dick Chrysler, before the House Committee on
Science, 104th Cong. (Sept. 12, 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis. Library, CNGTST
File; Andrew Lawler, Congress Targets Fusion, Favors NIH, 273 Science 303 (1996).
1996] 1725
Virginia Law Review
justified on "public goods" grounds. But if the character of the
research and the background legal rules make it likely that the
results will be readily appropriable, one might expect private
funding for the research to be forthcoming if the research ap-
pears sufficiently promising. Government funding for such re-
search is thus easily challenged as "corporate welfare" if indus-
try would otherwise make the investment itself, or as
government meddling in industrial policy if industry would oth-
erwise not deem the investment worthwhile.
How, then, can government funding of research be justified in
the Bayh-Dole era, when research performers are encouraged
to patent their results and to promote their private appropria-
tion? Public funding may still be justified under a public goods
rationale if the character of the research is such that patentable
outcomes are likely to be the exception rather than the rule, and
the research promises substantial social benefits that cannot be
captured by patent holders. Sixteen years into the Bayh-Dole
era, most university-based research is undoubtedly still of this
character. Patent revenues account for a trivial fraction of over-
all university research budgets, while public research funding
remains of critical importance.
But as university patenting and private funding of university
research increase, the time-honored distinction between "basic"
and "applied" research is becoming ever more difficult to main-
tain, particularly in fields that are of significant commercial in-
terest. As the revenue motive of research institutions impels
them to pursue patent rights in the sort of early-stage research
discoveries that in an earlier era they would have allowed to en-
ter the public domain, they put pressure on the patent system to
recognize patentable inventions in research results that arise
further upstream in the R&D process, thereby enlarging the
range of appropriable research results to include what by some
measures might still be regarded as "basic" research. And as
public sector research becomes more routinely appropriable, it
becomes more difficult to justify public funding to support it.
CONCLUSION
The present policy of promoting patents on federally-
supported inventions has become rapidly entrenched in U.S.
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law, although it is not clear that this policy always serves its ini-
tial agenda of furthering the transfer of new technologies to the
private sector for commercial development, particularly in the
case of discoveries that are born in university and government
laboratories. The recent controversy over ownership of patents
on discoveries made in the Applied Technology Program high-
lights some of the complexities involved in technology transfer
that the current policy fails to take into account.
Retreating from the policy may be difficult at this stage. Re-
search performers have adjusted to the incentives created by
current policy. When government policy creates and distributes
new property rights, it is inevitable that someone will protest if
those rights are later taken away. It does not necessarily follow
that those property rights are on balance creating new social
value that makes all of us better off.
Patents undoubtedly have a critical role to play in facilitating
technology transfer in some contexts. But they can also inter-
fere with technology transfer and with the broader goal of pro-
moting continuing technological progress. These goals may
sometimes be better served by allocating new knowledge to the
public domain. Government is uniquely situated to enrich the
public domain, and we should be wary of disabling the govern-
ment from performing this critical function.
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